Translation of Trust

Perceptions on Representation in Kosovo 2012-2023

Democracy for Development
Demokraci për zhvillim
Demokratija za razvoj

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Prishtina, December 2023.

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Democracy for Development

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Përmbajtja

Summary

Citizens' connection with politics hit the lowest level in 2016. Amidst a fierce political battle, citizens had lost trust on the declining parties but were still reluctant to trust the emerging Vetëvendosje party. This year, there is a slight decrease compared to 2019.

Urban voters, women, young people, the unemployed who are not actively seeking employment, and voters with above-average income feel less connected to politics. Perhaps Kosovo is not as clientelist as the popular belief portrays given that those working in the private sector turned out to be most politicized. Of those who associate themselves with AAK, nine/tenth feel very close, highest of all political parties (PDK 71%, VV 67% and LDK 56%).

It is positive that there are fewer party fans than before and the percentage of citizens who do not feel close to any party has also decreased. Politics has become about the personalities involved and less about issues and program, which is a negative trend.

Compared to 2012, more voters today choose the party of their choice based on their affinity for leaders and fewer pick because of the national interest. The advent of Vetëvendosje seems to be behind the increase in the rate of respondents that choose the party due to the leader (34% in 2023 compared to 27% eleven years ago).

Fewer Kosovars see the quality of the party program as important in favor of those who appreciate the quality of the team, the candidate list or regional representation.

On the day of the survey (June 2023), 58% of respondents declared they would certainly vote and the trend was higher

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among men (2/3) than women (half), although the remaining part of women stated they would go out to vote, but are not sure. Voters from rural areas are more willing to vote, as are the elderly.

The youngest age group seems to be most patriotic (voting in Kosovo's interest), the 25-34 age-group cares about the quality of the program, middle-aged respondents care about the quality of the team while the elderly see the leader as the most important. Better educated voters tend see regional representation as important.

Most LVV and AAK voters have chosen their party because of the leader. PDK voters support their party because of the quality of the team while LDK was chosen because of the quality of the program. AAK and PDK are more trusted by those who want representation of their region, while LVV and LDK enjoy more evenly-distributed support.

Support for professionally proven candidates has declined. In 2012, 23% of citizens declared they had quickly selected 5 names on the ballot, but this has since dropped significantly, which marks an improvement and greater care in selection. Urban voters cherish professional credentials while rural voters prefer candidates to be from their place of residence.

Women solidarity has been the reason for the vote for every fifth woman. But women feel less connected to political parties. Two fifths of women vote for women and respect the leader's suggestion for candidates less than men. This makes women a better target for parties which want to increase their constituency.

The data reveal a shift in how Kosovars access information. Internet has surpassed television for the first time, a trend which is more pronounced among the young, educated, wealthy, and urban population, who exhibit stronger support

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for online platforms. Individuals who watch television demonstrate a greater inclination to vote for leaders.

LVV has maintained its primacy with disproportionate support from urban and educated voters (also applies to LDK), while PDK and AAK enjoy more support in rural areas.

The majority of LVV voters have listed LDK (43%) as their second preferred party and the trend also applies the other way around. The similarity of the voters' profile makes these two parties to also be the main rivals. As they compete for similar voter pool, the rise of one means the fall of the other. LDK is also the second option for 27% of PDK voters, who have AAK (22%), other (19%) and LVV (15%) as their third option.

Recommendations

LDK and PDK must invest more in showcasing leadership, whereas AAK and LVV must invest more in the team and program positions.

The opposition should target the youth as their vote is not earmarked for a specific party. Their low voting trends makes them a potential opportunity for growth. A strong cause is needed to drive them to turn out to vote on election day.

The criteria and rationale for the selection of candidates should be well analyzed by parties when preparing their candidate lists. Every party should conduct surveys and focus groups for own election needs in order to test in detail the image and the public trust to the party and candidates.

The growing importance of the internet means good news for parties with more modest budgets as it equates the race for parties with ideas and fewer campaign resources. Older voters who may feel less represented in online debates may represent a challenge.

It has been a while since we know that geographic-based campaigning alone does not work. Parties wishing to increase their support should develop programs for various demographic categories, segmenting constituents by gender, age, interests, etc. and choose the most cost-effective ways to reach them.

Series of trends and surveys

Over the past two decades - since the war and declaration of independence – Kosovo has successfully navigated early transition challenges, established a stable sequence of government changes, and eradicated electoral fraud.

D4D engages to make politics more rational and less emotional and more about policy and less about individual charisma. D4D has been at the heart of electoral research and discussions on all these aspects related to elections with programs organized around six main pillars:

Electoral system;

1. Electoral fraud & justice;
2. Election monitoring and the electoral process;
3. Election trends (surveys & statistical data);
4. Ideological mapping; and
5. Representation of under-represented groups: youth and women.

Election Trends 2000-2014

A Numerical Analysis of Participation and Representation

Democracy for Development
Demokracia për zhvillim
Demokratija za razvoj

This publication is part of the trends (point 4 above) as are the cover pages of previous publications depicted below. D4D followed two types of trends, those that monitor issues that compare elections data over time and those which are measured through public opinion polls.

D4D's publications are research-oriented but with real results and impact on Kosovo's experience with democracy. In one of the first publications of this type, D4D highlighted the trend that women vote at a rate of 1/3 lower than that of men. Our other evidence also showed that parties were only focused on keeping their current voters, and few were paying attention to Kosovo's rapid demographics. Some parties took note of these findings and paid greater attention to these groups, rapidly increasing their voter base.

It was through data and observation that D4D identified one of the main sources of fraud – the orchestrated collusion of two parties to control the officials who check the ID in each polling station. This lead to our request then to place observers behind the polling station officials, a key moment which reversed the fraudulent trend.

Overall, our work on trends (surveys and actual statistics) which we seek to reinvigorate again has contributed to:

〉 the quality of democracy;

〉 quality and problems of intra-party dynamics and democracy;

〉 monitor the effects of open lists and to spot the needs for further changes of the electoral system;

⟩ monitor the progress of the election of women (by merit and by quota);

⟩ spot trends that cannot be seen by the naked eye and which only data divulge (aberrations of some municipalities where invalid ballots were much higher than the national average).

Sustaining the publication of electoral trends has demonstrated it can enable the scrutiny of potential issues without necessitating extensive coverage of observers, with high cost reduction.

This publication persists in efforts to boost youth and women turnout, addressing a persistent 10-15% lag behind the average, enhancing youth electability, and ensuring the inclusion of the elderly as digital features become more prevalent.

Introduction

From 2012, D4D conducts a public survey with recurrent questions, and this year it published the trends of representation and participation by 2023. This survey is published a few months following the completion, to avoid any politicization, as it does not aim to influence the voting mood, but rather to examine its causes. The question "who would you vote for" is asked not to measure the voting mood to generate news, but rather for purposes of multiple cross-tabulations, to understand the dynamics of such causes and nuances that affect better representation.

Chapters 1 through 3 summarize the three main themes, organized by sub-themes, that coincide with the specific questions posed in the survey.

Pleasant reading!

Survey methodology

D4D regularly recruits the services of the public opinion polling company, UBO Consulting, to conduct surveys for its needs. As part of the omnibus survey, D4D poses a number of questions, which were applied using the same methodology for years.

The omnibus is conducted in all municipalities in Kosovo, using stratified random sampling method. The random sample is stratified into three groups: on the basis of ethnicity, on the basis of residence, where for each municipality the sample is distributed in rural/urban parts, according to the official statistics of the Statistics Agency of Kosovo, and the third stratification is on the basis of the number of surveys conducted in each settlement.

This survey was conducted in the first half of June and has a confidence level of 95% and a margin of error of ±3%. The poll surveyed 1065 respondents over the age of 18: 815 Albanians, 150 Serbs, and 100 members of other communities. The sample was then weighted to reflect the trends in the ethnic structure of Kosovo.

The sample was selected by surveying every third house on the left side of the street, and a similar method is used to select persons over 18 years of age for interviews. As per standard methodology, quality control is done by verifying 30% of respondents according to standard methods.

In order to reduce the margin of error and ensure that readers can only cite data that we can statistically rely on, we have clustered the trends into several categories.

The main demographic breakdowns of the survey are gender (Male 49.6%/Female 50.4%), place of residence (Urban 44.4%/Rural 55.6%), and age, 18-24 (20.2%), 25-34 (23.7%), 35-44 (20.3%), 45-54 (15.3%) and 55 (20.5%).

Regarding the level of education, respondents answered with the number of school years they have completed – in terms of data presentation, the sample was divided into three approximately equal categories: less than secondary school (<secondary, 22.1 %), secondary (49.6%), and more than secondary school (>secondary, 28.3%).

In terms of income, respondents were divided into two categories, splitting those with less than 300 Euro (<300, 58.8%) or more than 300 Euro (301+, 31.4%).

It is easier to interpret trends of previous years if the reader is able verify whether the year was an election year or not. Therefore, the section below is an overview of all elections held in Kosovo, including their dates.

Overview of Elections from 2000 to 2023

Kosovo's post-war democratic history already counts 20 sets of elections: 8 national, 7 elections for municipal assembly and 5 mayoral elections. The table below depicts the dates of all elections in Kosovo since 2000 when Kosovo organized the first began with when it was still under international trusteeship.

Year	Elections for			Survey
	Parliament	Municipal Assemblies	Mayors	
2000		28-Oct-00		
2001	17-Nov-01			
2002		26-Oct-02		
2003				
2004	23-Oct-04			
2005				
2006				
2007		17-Nov-07		
2008				
2009		15-Nov-09		
2010	12-Dec-10			
2011				
2012				Oct-12
2013		3-Nov-13		
2014	8-Jun-14			Jun-14
2015				Mar-Nov-15
2016				Feb-Dec-16
2017	11-Jun-17	22-Oct-17		Mar-Sept-17
2018				Jun-18
2019	6-Oct-19			Mar-19
2020				
2021	14-Oct-21	17-Oct-21		Sept-21
2022				Mar-Dec-22
2023				Mar-Jun-23

1. Relationship with politics

Being active in politics is one of the indicators how healthy is the citizen's trust in elected officials and how accountability works. D4D has regularly asked this question in surveys, and we now have a long-term trend that measures this phenomenon with two questions: (1.1) meetings with elected officials in the last 12 months and (1.2) closeness with the party.

1.1. Meetings with elected officials

The survey below presents the trend of citizens meeting the mayor, municipal assembly member, or member of parliament in the last 12 months. In a rather fierce competition period between political rivals, meetings of politicians with citizens has peaked in 2014. The survey was carried out precisely during the election period, with the local elections held e few months back, at the end of 2013. 2018 also saw an increasing trend compared to previous years, perhaps due to it being conducted shortly after 2017 when three pairs of elections were held.

In the last 12 months I have reached out to...

	Member of Parliament					Municipal Assembly Member					Mayor				
	2012	2014	2015	2018	2019	2012	2014	2015	2018	2019	2012	2014	2015	2018	2019
	5%	19%	13%	14%	12%	10%	27%	23%	19%	18%	10%	30%	14%	17%	14%

Understandably, people meet municipal assembly members more often, as they are closer geographically, and there are more councilors (over 1000 in all of Kosovo). The decline of meetings with MPs and the flat trend of meetings with Mayors is of concern.

1.2. Closeness to political parties

D4D has measured citizens' closeness with politics since 2012 through the question how close they feel to the party they support. The lowest level was recorded in 2016 but 2023 also marks a decline compared to 2019. It is perhaps an improvement that there are fewer militants, but the percentage of citizens who do not feel close to a party has also decreased.

There are no ideal levels as per the rate of closeness, but it is clear that it is better to have fewer citizens feel detached from politics or who feel dogmatically close to one party. Applying this criterion, 2014 seems it the closest to the ideal.

The year of 2016 was the year which marked a fierce battle between the rising Vetëvendosje (which had not yet created a stable voter base) and the dwindling trust of the main parties then (which had coalesced around the label PAN).

How close do you feel to the party you support/vote for?

11%	5%	15%		6%	9%	3%
15%	18%	29%	46%	17%	19%	13%
11%	18%	21%	25%	19%	15%	18%
38%	43%	27%	24%	44%	39%	49%
25%	15%	8%	5%	13%	18%	16%

Oct. 2012 · Jun. 2014 · Mar.-Nov. 2015 · Feb.-Dec. 2016 · Jun. 2018 · Mar. 2019 · Jun. 2023

Legend:
- don't know/ refuse/ no answer
- not close at all
- not that close
- somewhat close
- fan

Closeness to the party (2023, by gender)

♂ | 20% | 51% | 14% | 13% | 1%

♀ | 12% | 47% | 22% | 14% | 5%

■ fan   ■ somewhat close   ■ not that close   ■ not cose at all   ■ don't know/ refuse/ no answer

Women tend to be more suspicious of political parties then men. Men outnumber women by 12% on feeling close to a political party. Rural voters tend to feel closer to political parties (68%) than urban voters (62%) although the difference is lower than that between men and women.

Closeness to the party (2023, by level of education)

Less than secondary (<) | 14% | 48% | 17% | 17% | 4%

Secondary education | 14% | 53% | 17% | 11% | 4%

More than secondary (>) | 21% | 42% | 20% | 15% | 2%

■ fan   ■ somewhat close   ■ not that close   ■ not cose at all   ■ don't know/ refuse/ no answer

Elderly respondents feel closer to their party while the middle age respondents (45-54 years old) feels lowest closeness with politics.

The trend by education is also mild where those with average education (high school) report to feel closer to political parties than those with more or less education. Although the reasons behind may vary, the trend seems to be the same, where the educated are more critical and more likely to be voters for a cause rather than committed to names, while those with lower education may not be involved at all.

Perhaps the most telling indicator in a clientelist political culture is to cross-tabulate closeness to a political party with employment status. Respondents with income higher than the average feel less close to the party of their choice, while those with lower income feel closer.

Closeness to the party (2023, by Income)

Housewives, youngsters and respondents who are unemployed and not looking for work feel least close to a party as do young people. Respondents who are looking for a job, or who are employed in the public sector report higher closeness with political parties. Perhaps Kosovo is not as

clientelist as the popular belief portrays – surprisingly, those working in the private sector turnout to be more politicized.

Closeness to the party (2023, by employment)

	fan	somewhat close	not that close	not cose at all	don't know/ refuse/ no answer
Unemployed - looking for work	6%	54%	22%	18%	
Unemployed - not looking for work	26%	32%	26%	17%	
Employed in the public sector	22%	43%	18%	12%	4%
Employed in the private sector	20%	50%	15%	11%	3%
Employed from time to time	8%	61%	21%	11%	
Pensioner	14%	57%	17%	11%	1%
Housewife	12%	45%	18%	16%	10%
Student	29%	25%	29%	17%	

Should elections be discussed in the near future, the graph below may be one of the most important for political parties. Among those who report close to AAK report highest readiness to vote if elections would be held next Sunday (standard how this question is asked).

Parties must monitor not only the level of support but also the level of mobilization in which they can count on election day. Parties whose voters feel closer to them, can count on a higher turnout.

The polling companies should also take this into consideration as the level of support should be analyzed also taking into account the readiness to vote. A party which, in principle, has a higher support may fare worse in elections if some of the less motivated voters do not turn out on election day.

AAK voters report to be most loyal to their party (91%), followed by PDK (71%), VV (67%) while those who associate themselves with LDK feel least close (56%).

Closeness to the party (2023, by readiness to vote for the party)

Party	fan	somewhat close	not that close	not close at all	don't know/refuse/no answer
V	16%	51%	18%	11%	4%
PDK	27%	44%	14%	15%	
LDK	11%	45%	24%	17%	3%
AKR	21%	70%	4%	1%	3%
other	15%	43%	18%	19%	4%

- fan
- somewhat close
- not that close
- not cose at all
- don't know/ refuse/ no answer

2. Voter behavior

People choose parties for various reasons and it is important for parties and democracy activists to understand this dynamic. D4D engages to make politics more rational and less emotional and more about policy and less about individual charisma. D4D routinely asks respondents in opinion polls to state what is the reason they choose the party of their choice.

Compared to 2012, more voters today choose the party of their choice based on their affinity for leaders. The rise of Vetëvendosje seems to have increased the rate that respondents choose the party for the leader (34% in 2023 compared to 27% eleven years ago).

The number of those who pick their favorite political party because of the national interest of Kosovo has sharply decreased from 26% to 16% now. Those who see the quality of the party program as important have also declined by 5% while those who appreciate the quality of the team and of the candidate list have both increased somewhat, as have those who prefer to see their region better represented. This leads us to conclude that politics has become more about the personalities involved and less about issues and program, which is a negative trend.

Cross-tabulation by gender yields main difference in two variables – 22% of men see the quality of the team as important, compared to 15% of women. Inversely more women like parties which engage in the national interest of Kosovo, which could be due to the fact that women benefit less from a clientelist interests.

2.1. Turn-Out This Sunday (June)

Around 58% of respondents declared they would certainly vote if elections were held this Sunday, and the trend is higher among men (2/3) than women (around half), although the remaining share of women stated they would go out to vote, but are not certain.

**Would you vote if early parliamentary elections were held?** (2023)

Women still vote at a lower rate than men, although the gap has narrowed over time, as the chart below shows.

Voters from rural areas are more certain that they would vote (59%) with other categories answering the same. The elderly are more diligent voters and nearly 70% are certain they would vote, with an opposite trend observed with younger voters.

Would you vote if elections were to be held this Sunday? (2023, by gender)

65%
51%
31%
20%
3% 5%
8% 10%
4% 2%

♂ ♀   ♂ ♀   ♂ ♀   ♂ ♀   ♂ ♀
absolutely   maybe   probably   no   don't know
            yes   no   refuse

Parties seeking to increase their support should target younger people because they vote in lower numbers and are less committed to a particular party. At the same time, younger people do not vote in high numbers and a strong incentive is needed to get them to vote.

Trends by education are mild and more educated voters are slightly more likely to vote. In terms of profession, categories with the lowest turn-out are the unemployed, public sector employees, students and housewives.

Would you vote if elections were to be held this Sunday? (2023)

	<=24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+
	3%	4%	4%	3%	2%
	7%	9%	10%	10%	9%
	3%	8%	5%	4%	1%
	30%	25%	30%	22%	19%
	57%	54%	52%	61%	69%

2.2. Reasons for choosing a party

Reasons to vote for a political party

Reason	2012	2023
for the leader	27%	34%
for Kosovo's interests	26%	17%
for the quality of the program	16%	11%
because the party has the best candidates' list	8%	10%
the party represents the interests of my region	6%	9%
for the quality of the team	6%	8%
I know someone at the party	1%	4%
I have a family member in the party	2%	3%
because I am a member of the party	1%	2%
don't know/ refuse	5%	2%

Rural respondents tend to see the leader as more important than urban respondents (35% vs. 32%) while urban respondents care about the quality of the team (22% vs. 16 %). It is to be expected that rural voters care to see their

region represented (10% vs. 8% for urban respondents) and 8% of them tend to choose the party if they know someone there (compared to 5% for urban voters).

Reasons to vote for a political party (2023, by age)

Age	for the leader	for the quality of the team	for Kosovo's interests	for the quality of the program	the party represents the interests of my region	I know someone at the party	because I am a member of the party	other
<=24	28%	20%	23%	6%	13%	7%	1%	3%
25-34	29%	17%	15%	20%	10%	7%	1%	1%
35-44	31%	23%	14%	7%	9%	13%	1%	2%
45-54	37%	16%	14%	14%	10%	4%	2%	3%
55+	44%	16%	18%	9%	7%	4%	3%	1%

Legend:
- for the leader
- for the quality of the team
- for Kosovo's interests
- for the quality of the program
- the party represents the interests of my region
- I know someone at the party
- because I am a member of the party
- other

The youngest age group seems to be most patriotic (Kosovo interest), the 25-34 age-group cares about the quality of the program, middle-aged respondents care about the quality of the team while the elderly see the leader as the most important.

Respondents with less education tend to view the leader as most important (38%) but those with high school or higher view the quality of the team as more important. Those with university education view the interest of Kosovo as the most important reason why they rally behind a political party.

Reasons for choosing a party	< secondary	secondary	> secondary
for the leader	41%	37%	24%
for the quality of the team	8%	8%	9%
for the quality of the program	11%	11%	12%
for Kosovo's interests	18%	12%	23%
I am a member of the party	0%	2%	1%
the party has the best candidates' list	7%	12%	9%
I know someone at the party	4%	4%	4%
I have a family member in the party	3%	3%	3%
represents the interests of my region	6%	9%	12%
don't know/ refuse	3%	1%	2%

It is interesting that those with higher university degrees also tend to see it as important for the party of their choice to engage for the interest of the region they come from (12%, almost double than those with less education).

Kosovars with higher income also tend to see the leader as less important and place higher importance on other traits compared to those with less than average income.

The reason to vote in 2021 (2023, by income)

	< 300 €	301+ €
other	2%	3%
I know someone at the party	6%	10%
the party represents the interests of my region	8%	12%
for the quality of the program	10%	13%
for Kosovo's interests	17%	14%
for the quality of the team	17%	22%
for the leader	40%	26%

Most LVV and AAK voters have chosen the party because of the leader. PDK voters support their party because of the quality of the team while LDK is chosen because of the quality of the program. AAK and PDK are more trusted by those who want representation of their region, while LVV and LDK enjoy more widely distributed support.

The reason to vote in the next elections (2023)

The chart above explains the reasons why supporters choose a party and provides information on where they can improve.

The leadership transition in which PDK and LDK have been going through is especially noticeable in LDK, where the percentage of respondents choosing this party because of its leader is the lowest. The reasons for voting LDK are more scattered, with significant proportion for the choice of the program and because the respondents know someone in the party.

PDK is chosen because of its team and regional representation. Except for the leader, AAK voters vote for this party because they know someone there and because they appreciate the representation of their region.

LDK and PDK should invest in the team and program presentations, but AAK and LVV should not rely only on the gravitas of the leaders, but rather invest in the team and in thematic positions.

2.3. Choice of candidates

In addition to the question about the reasons why voters choose a party, the survey also asked about the criteria for choosing the candidates within the party. Respondents stated that they mostly prefer professionally proven candidates (28%), although this decreased from 36% in 2012.

Hometown candidates are chosen by 20% of voters, followed by those who choose candidates they know personally (14%). Candidates close to the leader or suggested by the party are preferred by 9% of voters and those who witnessed the war also by 9% (an increasing trend). Support for the leader and for the three categories of personal acquaintance indicates an increase in the personalization of politics, where voters are

less focused on program and more on personal reasons for preference.

In 2012, 23% of citizens declared they had quickly selected 5 names on the ballot, but this has dropped to 2% now (mainly young people), which marks an improvement and greater care in selection.

In the last elections I voted for the candidates.

	2012	2014	2018	2023
professionally proven	36%	31%	31%	28%
first 5 names	23%	11%	3%	2%
close to the leader	12%	7%	6%	9%
from my town	11%	22%	31%	20%
know him/her	7%	13%	13%	14%
proven in the war	6%	4%	4%	9%
my gender		2%	2%	6%
my religion			2%	8%
other			4%	4%
don't know/ no answer/ didn't vote	4%	12%	5%	

- -

Solidarity among women to vote for another woman was a selection trigger for every fifth woman, and is certainly one of the reasons why the number of women elected to the Assembly of Kosovo has increased.

The chart below also shows the reasons for selecting candidates based on their place of residence. Urban voters look for professional credentials, while rural voters prefer candidates from region.

**Votes for candidates** (2023, by place of residence)

	Rural	Urban
professionally proven	29%	27%
from my town	18%	22%
know him/her	14%	14%
close to the leader	9%	9%
proven in the war	8%	9%
other	22%	19%

Votes for candidates (2023, by age group)

	<=24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55+
professionally proven	31%	30%	25%	27%	29%
from my town	15%	19%	20%	23%	23%
know him/her	14%	14%	12%	14%	13%
close to the leader	9%	9%	10%	8%	10%
proven in the war	9%	6%	9%	11%	8%
my religion	8%	9%	11%	6%	7%
other	15%	13%	13%	12%	9%

Young people tend to quickly choose 5 names (which is also the case with voters with less education). The middle-aged (45-54) continue to choose war-proven candidates (who are also more supported by respondents with a lower level of education). Other trends can also be observed in the chart.

Less educated voters appear to be more parochial, with 21-22% of people with secondary education or less preferring candidates from their hometown, compared to 16% of more educated voters.

Votes for candidates (2023, by level of education)

	< Secondary	Secondary	> Secondary
professionally proven	9%	26%	15%
from my town	6%	22%	8%
know him/her	3%	14%	7%
close to the leader	2%	9%	5%
proven in the war	4%	7%	4%
my religion	2%	8%	5%
other	4%	11%	6%

*multi-response question.

Respondents with less than average income prefer professionally proven candidates (31% compared to 26% for those with less than average income). Only 10% of those below the average prefer candidates whom they know personally, compared to 18% of those with an income above 300 Euro.

Some slight trends can be observed through cross-tabulation of reasons for choosing candidates with party affiliation.

Votes for candidates *(by closeness to a preferred political party)*	Close	Not close
professionally proven	29 %	**31 %**
my town	20 %	**22 %**
I know him/her	**16 %**	10 %
close to the leader	**10 %**	7 %
proven in the war	**9 %**	7 %
my religion	8 %	**9 %**
my gender	4 %	**10 %**
other	4 %	5 %

Two fifths of women vote for women and respect the leader's suggestion for choice of candidate less than men.

This discussion is important for political parties when they decide on the order of candidates. Every party should conduct surveys and focus groups for own election needs to test in detail the image and the trust among various demographic categories.

2.4.   Source of information

The source of information is important and it is one of the main trends that has changed over time. In the last survey in 2023, 41% of respondents were informed online, a significant increase from previous years. In 2012, most citizens were informed through newspapers (87%), radio (1%) and friends and family (1%). Today, online information also prevails over TV.

**Source of information over the years**

Women receive more information through television than men (30% compared to 27%) and use the internet less to get informed. With regard to residence, the trend is more significant, with 2/3 of citizens in rural areas relying on television, compared to urban areas where slightly more than half are informed via TV. An analysis of the age sample reveals an even more significant trend, with age groups over 35 follow TV more for information, while younger age groups rely on the internet.

Source of information (2023, by age)

|	TV	Internet	Other
<=24	34%	65%	1%
25-34	45%	51%	1%
35-44	54%	42%	1%
45-54	71%	27%	1%
55+	85%	3%	1%

More educated respondents (with more than a secondary education degree) tend to receive information online, while those with less than secondary education almost entirely relying on TV (80%).

Source of information (2023, by level of education)

A similar trend is revealed by the cross-tabulation based on income, where those earning more than 300 Euros rely more on the internet, while the poorest rely on TV.

**Source of information** (2023, by income)

The young, the educated, the wealthy and the urban population rely more on the internet compared to other categories, which rely on TV.

This information can be useful to political entities during the campaign, which can make use of effective tools to target the relevant target. This finding can be also useful to independent candidates and candidates for MPs who do not have support

from the party, as campaigning online is cheaper than on television.

The trend has also been compared with responses of voting trends in the last general elections in 2021. VV voters tended to be informed through television, with the same trend also applying to PDK and LDK, but to a lesser extent. Only respondents close to AAK have stated that they get informed through the internet.

Source of information (2023, by votes cast in 2021)

Those who watch television also tend to vote for the leader. This is perhaps natural, considering that television is mainly a national medium and exposure there generates distributed support throughout the country. Those with locally focused interests (see the last two columns "I know someone..." and "... my region") rely more on information from the internet.

Votes for the political party (2023, by source of information)

|	TV	Internet	Other
for the leader	66%	33%	1%
for the quality of the team	60%	38%	2%
for the quality of the program	59%	37%	4%
for Kosovo's interests	62%	37%	2%
know someone at the party	52%	43%	5%
the party represents the interests of my region	49%	50%	1%

The chart below presents a cross-tabulation of the same answer depending on how the respondents choose the candidates.

Respondents who receive the information from the internet have a lower tendency to vote.

Would citizens vote this Sunday? (2023, by source of information)

	TV	Internet
◯ YES	59%	41%
✕ NO	54%	46%

Votes for candidates (2023, by source of information)

|	TV	Internet	Other
professionally proven	60%	38%	2%
from my town	58%	41%	1%
know him/her	52%	47%	1%
close to the leader	57%	38%	5%
proven in the war	57%	42%	1%
my religion	55%	42%	3%
my gender	62%	35%	3%
other	41%	56%	3%

3. Voting Trends

The most controversial part of any survey is the voting trend for political parties. This survey is published a few months following the survey in June, as it does not aim to influence the voting mood, but rather to examine its causes. The question "who would you vote for" is not asked in order to generate news, but rather for purposes of multiple cross-tabulations, to understand the dynamics of such causes and nuances that affect quality representation. The level of support may be a primary concern for parties, but they perform this more frequently than we do. D4D breaks this down into more specific segments to study the drivers behind the trends.

3.1. Who would you vote for if elections were held this Sunday?

LVV remains the preferred entity in urban areas, which, to some extent, also applies to LDK, while PDK and AAK enjoy more support in rural areas. During its growth, LVV has relied on women voters, which has now changed slightly.

Voting this Sunday (2023, by gender)

	V	PDK	LDK	(AAK)	other	don't know/ refuse
♀	47%	58%	51%	51%	44%	49%
♂	53%	42%	49%	49%	56%	51%

Voting this Sunday (2023, by place of residence)

|	Urban	Rural
don't know/refuse	11%	10%
Other	8%	8%
(AAK)	6%	9%
LDK	15%	14%
PDK	11%	18%
V	49%	41%

In terms of income, LDK voters seem to have higher incomes.

Votes for the political party this Sunday (2023, by income)

|	V	PDK	LDK	(AAK)	other	don't know/refuse
< 300 €	48%	14%	13%	8%	8%	10%
301+ €	39%	12%	18%	10%	9%	12%

Support for LVV increases on par with the educational level, with a similar trend applying to LDK too. PDK enjoys support among citizens with average education, while AAK has the opposite trend to LVV and LDK, and enjoys support from voters with less education.

Votes for the political party this Sunday (2023, by level of education)

	V	PDK	LDK		other	don't know/ refuse
< Secondary	40%	15%	12%	9%	13%	11%
Secondary	45%	17%	15%	8%	6%	9%
> Secondary	46%	12%	15%	7%	7%	13%

VV has garnered more support by young people and less among middle aged voters.

Votes for the political party this Sunday (2023, by age)

	V	PDK	LDK	(emblem)	other	don't know/ refuse
<=24	51%	15%	13%	5%	7%	9%
25-34	49%	10%	14%	7%	10%	11%
35-44	31%	21%	15%	9%	10%	14%
45-54	40%	19%	14%	9%	8%	10%
55+	49%	11%	16%	9%	5%	9%

The table below shows respondents' motives for choosing the candidates, depending on their party. LVV and LDK voters have a higher tendency to vote for professionally proven candidates.

Respondents who vote for candidates proven during the war are mostly PDK and AAK supporters. PDK respondents tend to vote based on suggestions of the leader or the party.

Respondents who vote for politicians whom they know personally mostly belong to AAK, while those who quickly circle 5 names tend to be more LDK voters.

Votes for candidates (By political preference)	LVV	PDK	LDK	AAK
Candidates from my town	22%	19 %	22 %	23%
Candidates my age	4%	2%	3%	1%
Candidates I know personally	13%	10%	15%	20%
Candidates of my gender	7%	4%	5%	5%
Candidates close to the leader or suggested by the party	9%	10%	8%	5%
Professionally proven candidates	33%	21%	31%	22%
Candidates proven during the war	3%	21%	4%	16%
Candidates belonging to my religion	7%	13%	6%	8%
I picked 5 numbers very quickly	3%	1%	5%	1%
Other (specify)	0%	0%	1%	0%

How would the distribution of seats in the Assembly of Kosovo look like if it were determined by the hypothetical elections on the date this survey? In the chart graph below, LVV is placed in the left part of the half-pie chart as an ideologically leftist party. Right-wing parties are placed on the right and parties assessed with a lower polarization with LVV were placed in the middle – which makes the analysis of possible coalition governments easier to assess.

What would the Assembly of Kosovo composition be according to the political will expressed on the survey conducted in June 2023?

If the elections were held in June 2023 when the survey was conducted, VV would win 44% of the vote and, excluding the respondents' preferences (I don't know or refuse), this would translate into 54 seats in the Assembly. It would need a smaller party and representatives of non-Serb minorities to form a government.

3.2. From 2021 to 2023?

There is an increase in confidence in LVV and PDK and a decrease in others in the category of the unemployed and employees in the public sector (the first three rows). Pensioners have shown a decrease in confidence in LVV and LDK, while housewives have expressed an increase in confidence in PDK and AAK. Students have marked a decrease in confidence in all parties, except LDK.

| Changes in the support for political entities from 2021-2023 by employment status			
	LVV	**PDK**	**LDK**	**AAK**
Unemployed - looking for work	↑	↑	↓	↓
Unemployed - not looking for work	↑	↑	↓	=
Employed in the public sector	↑	↑	↓	=
Employed in the private sector	=	=	=	=
Employed from time to time	↑	↓	↓	↑
Pensioner	↑	=	↓	=
Housewife		↑	=	↑
Student	↓	↓	↑	↓

A comparison of answers to the question who did you vote for in 2021 (for national elections) and how would you vote if elections were held this Sunday reveals interesting trends. LVV has a decrease in confidence among men (from 2021), while PDK marks a decrease in confidence among women and an increase among men. LDK has recorded a slight increase in both genders.

The difference from 2021 and who would you vote for this Sunday (2023, by gender)


Similarly, the trend from 2021 to 2023, in terms of residence shows that LVV marks lower support among the rural population and an increase in the urban population, as did AAK.

The difference from 2021 and who they would vote for this Sunday (2023, by place of residence)

The next chart shows the trend by various age-groups for each party. LDK marks an increased confidence among the elderly and it seems the opposite applies for PDK. LVV has marked an increase with the younger voters, but a decrease in other age groups.

The difference from 2021 and who they would vote for this Sunday (2023, by age)

|	V	PDK	LDK	AAK	other	don't know/refuse
<=24	4.2%	-0.5%	-1.7%	0.1%	0.2%	-2.3%
25-34	-0.4%	1.7%	-0.1%	-0.2%	-0.9%	-0.1%
35-44	-7.2%	0.8%	0.2%	0.9%	-1.6%	6.8%
45-54	-2.2%	-6.7%	6.0%	-2.4%	1.2%	4.1%
55+	-2.3%	-2.5%	0.7%	-0.5%	0.8%	3.8%

3.3. Second preference

In addition to general support, acceptability by supporters of other parties is also an important indicator. If a citizen loses confidence in his party for any reason, chances are he/she will likely move to the second preferred party. In addition, when municipalities have runoff mayoral elections, the popularity of a party/candidate among the voters of other parties is often decisive.

The utility of this question is limited given the high reluctance to answer. More than half of the respondents (almost 2/3 among men) declared that they do not know, refuse to answer, or have no second choice (last column).

If your preferred party is not running, what is your second choice? (2023, by gender)

This question was also asked in previous years' surveys and the trends over time are interesting. LVV has marked a

decline as a second choice, perhaps normal as it increased as first choice.

LDK has increased as the second choice, higher than ever before (14%). PDK has marked a decline as the second choice in 2019 but returned to its previous highest level (8%). AAK has fallen as the second choice to 4%.

LDK as the second preferred choice is more prevalent among the over 45 age-group, PDK among the middle-aged, and VV among the young.

The fact that women have a second choice more often than men further proves that they are more flexible and less predetermined voters.

The two charts below show the trends of second preferences from 2012 to now. The next page shows the general trends, and the following page the trends for different age categories.

Due to the high rate of refusal to answer this question, the margin of error is higher and the answers should only be used only as a general guide.

If your preferred party is not running, what is your second choice?

Party	Year	Value
V	2012	5%
	2014	18%
	2015	14%
	2018	6%
	2019	14%
	2023	8%
LDK	2012	9%
	2014	13%
	2015	9%
	2018	5%
	2019	11%
	2023	14%
PDK	2012	5%
	2014	7%
	2015	8%
	2018	4%
	2019	2%
	2023	8%
AAK	2012	14%
	2014	5%
	2015	13%
	2018	6%
	2019	6%
	2023	4%
Small parties	2012	7%
	2014	16%
	2015	12%
	2018	5%
	2019	4%
	2023	6%
Minority parties	2012	0%
	2014	3%
	2015	2%
	2018	1%
	2019	1%
	2023	4%

If your preferred party is not running, what is your second choice? (2023, by age)

|	V	PDK	LDK	AAK	other
<=24	8%	8%	14%	3%	8%
25-34	10%	7%	12%	7%	10%
35-44	9%	11%	10%	4%	13%
45-54	7%	9%	20%	5%	8%
55+	5%	5%	15%	4%	9%

The table below shows the support for all parties among supporters of other parties. The majority of LVV voters have listed LDK (44%) as their second choice, followed by other parties (24%), PDK (10%) and AAK (8%). The opposite trend also applies, with 42% of LDK voters listing LVV as the second choice, followed by PDK (36%), and 12% for AAK.

June 2023		Who would you vote for this Sunday, and what is your second preference if your preferred party did not run?				
		LVV	PDK	LDK	AAK	other
Who would you vote for this Sunday?	LVV		10%	44%	8%	24%
	PDK	16%		27%	21%	18%
	LDK	42%	36%		12%	1%
	AAK	19%	30%	35%		8%
	other	31%	14%	10%	1%	38%

LDK is also the second option for 27% of PDK voters, who list AAK (21%), other (18%) and LVV (16%) as their third option. LDK remains the second preferred option also for AAK voters (35%), followed by those who would support PDK (30%) and LVV (19%).

Democracy for Development Institute (D4D) was founded in April 2010 by a group of analysts who were increasingly concerned that the state-building process had sidelined democracy. The Vision of D4D is to promote active and educated citizens, who fully participate in the public space and uses it for representation and decision-making to discuss and build consensus on the allocation of resources that are efficient, fast, long and leading to equal development. D4D influences specific policies, promotes a cross-sectoral approach to problem solving and addresses institutional decision-making routines by recommending incremental improvements and operates with maximum effectiveness to fully promote Kosovo's stabilization and democratic development.

For more information about D4D activities, please visit our website: **www.d4d-ks.org**