Translation of Trust

Perception of Representation and Participation
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Prishtina, September 2013
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Executive Summary

As we slouch towards democracy, it is useful to reflect and see if we are moving in the best path and in the right pace. We put meticulous design into a survey which may become a regular tool to self-evaluate and repair our trek towards the republic. The result of this reflection are not encouraging but they form a base-line for future comparison.

Most Kosovars do not see the Parliament as a reflection of the society. A major chunk of respondents feel unrepresented and have refrained from voting. Except voting, Kosovars make less of membership in civic groups. Except membership in religious groups, all other types of membership have dwindled, a sign of serious democratic deficit and a ripe environment for aggressive expressions of public participation.

Elected officials mainly meet up with party fans. Undecided voters tend to make their choice only on Election Day, an indication of a high rate of angry votes. Voters displayed strong support for open lists, at a higher rate than their predilection of candidates over parties.

Responses challenge the myth that Kosovo’s political scene is static which often discourages new parties. Only half of the voters voted the same from 2007 to 2010, hardly the stable party scene than has traditionally been believed. A fifth voted differently and the rest abstained.

It is encouraging that as families get smaller and attain greater education, Kosovars become more allergic to violations and they change parties. Opposition groups are less antagonistic than non-voters, but even the most powerless Kosovars have not lost the belief in the power of the vote.
Introduction

Kosovo is governed by a representative democracy and the relationship of citizens with their representatives is at the heart of what democracy is about. As most of us tend our everyday affairs, it is discomforting if those we have entrusted the public purse to do not stand for our interest. Hence the title of this paper, “Translation of Trust”, which we endeavour to measure.

Kosovo’s young state is often compared to a young baby, but nowhere is this as true as it its democratization efforts. The transition has been patchy with frequent setbacks. Kosovo’s nascent democracy indeed needs to be nurtured like a newborn. This involves taking stock of its progress and asking difficult questions. The road ahead is only possible if we honestly assess the current situation for this is our point of departure.

We did not only intend to take a snapshot at the current situation, but to look at the trend. In our bid to understand dynamics of electoral behaviour, most democracy-related questions have been cross-tabulated by various demographic features.

The first section describes the methodology with some brief demographic remarks. The substance of the paper is organised in five thematic chapters (i) representation, (ii) participation, (iii) trust in elections, (iv) electoral system and voter behaviour, and (v) leadership expectations.
Survey Methodology & Demographics

This survey was conducted with 952 respondents and back-check in person was made with 176 respondents. Just above half of the respondents were male (486 men composing 50.5%), while 466 (49.5%) were female. The sample was random and reflected age groups, income levels, and education levels. The data was weighted prior to its use for our analysis. Fieldwork and data processing was conducted by Index Kosova research organizations, BBSS Gallup International.

The survey is representative of the adult (18+) population as specified in the sampling frame. Exclusions include people in hospitals, prisons, military facilities and similar. Since there is no census data for Kosovo, the breakdown of the population by municipalities is based on the registered voters broken down by municipality. The survey’s method is face-to-face, paper and pencil interview ‘in home’ of respondent, with multi-staged random probability sampling. The sample is representative of households in Kosovo. The margin of error for the sample at the country level: ± 2.5% with 95% confidence level.

Demographic

Before the paper embarks on analysis of representation and participation, there a number of demographic trends worth noting. D4D believes that it is virtually impossible to make headway in its democracy unless Kosovo becomes a more equitable society that empowers women, nurtures diversity. In this regard, it is important to understand the various societal divisions and they interplay in governance.

One of the main indicators of societal development is gender development and the rate that women close the gap with men. Kosovo will find it baffling to develop and consolidate
its democracy for as long as women do not progress socially and manage to improve their wellbeing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Gender</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working?</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A housewife?</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A student of apprentice?</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired/disabled?</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed and looking for work?</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, but not looking for work?</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Representation and participation are both means to equitable development and are served well by growing equitability. One of the factors that the survey inquired is one’s occupation. Almost two-thirds of Kosovar females are housewives while only 10% of them are working. This structural challenge is usually seen from a development lens, but it inhibits not only development but democratisation too.
A common indicator that we cross-tabulated results with was the level of education. There is a major gender gap in the educational attainment which further reduces the ability of women to exercise influence over policy-making. Women consist of nearly 80% of Kosovars without formal education, and in reverse only a quarter of the share with graduate degrees.

Except gender and education, this paper has cross-tabulated results with age, family size, income, as well as less common features such as practice or religion, sources of information.

**Religion**

Around 40% of Kosovars never attend religious service, while around 35% attend religious service at least once a month. Women are no less religious but practice religion less often. The proportion of Kosovars who practice a few times a year, corresponds with the proportion of Kosovars who consider themselves “moderate”. The proportion of Kosovars who never practice religion is close to 40% (much higher among women), which corresponds to the share of Kosovars who consider themselves “liberal”. A tiny share of Kosovars consider themselves non-believers (1%) while a similar share considered fundamentalist.
Source of Information

An important precondition to a functioning democracy is a diverse source of information. Most Kosovars cite that they rely on daily newspapers, although considering the rate of circulation of newspapers, this can hardly be true. Urban areas and especially Prishtina seem to rely less on newspapers and more on internet and television to obtain information. Of the various television channels, our survey indicated that over 41% rely on RTK for information. RTK does not command the attention of female viewers which disproportionately follow RTV 21.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TV stations for information on current issues</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RTK</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTV21</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTV</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klan Kosova</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None/Don’t Know/Ref</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also clear market segmentation in terms of age groups. RTK enjoys the attention of the elderly while Klan Kosova targets more the younger age groups. KTV gears to the middle-aged while RTV21 targets female viewers of all ages (30% of female viewership compared to 16% among
men).

**Size of the Family**

One of the demographic factors that we reviewed is the size of the family. The sample was representative and reflects Kosovars who live in small and large families alike. Most respondents lived in families of 5-6 members, as randomly found with our survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most worrisome areas (by family size)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents (no)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure/roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are some concerns that are specific to smaller and larger families. Education and electricity pose a concern for large families, probably due to the formidable cost of educating many children. Infrastructure and waste pose an issue for smaller families largely residing in urban areas. Generally, the size of the family turned out not to a determining factor and we have presented very few cross-tabulations with this indicator.

Cross-tabulating results by income yields curious results too. Issues such as economy, infrastructure, and electricity affect Kosovars of all income levels while others affect some income groups differently. Health and education pose a serious concern for the wealthy while environment is a concern for the middle class. Unemployment is a major concern for the poor, who are also concerned with drinking water and waste.
**Areas of Concern**

Peoples’ concerns are very important to track for they are essentially areas over which their priorities are formed, and which inform expectations that leaders are to deliver. Kosovars are primarily concerned with economic development. Over a third of men (and just under a third of women) believe that economy is the most important issue. Healthcare is the second most relevant concern but more so for women (23%) and less so for men (13%). Drinking water, unemployment and education indicate a similar breakdown across the gender, while electricity, waste, and environment are other concerns that preoccupy Kosovars (see next page).

Not all concerns are equally shared among all age groups. Despite the economy being the most worrisome problem for all Kosovars, the elderly are less concerned with it than their younger compatriots and a similar trend holds for education. Instead, they are more concerned with health and roads. Later in the paper it is indicated that the elderly have often different voting patterns from the young, and parties that gear to their support should ensure that matters of their concern are adopted and evoked in their party programs adequately.

Inversely, younger respondents tend to worry more about issues that influence the long-term, such as economy, education, and it seem to be more influenced by a higher level of education for they are also concerned more with environment and waste.
Areas of Concern (by gender)

- Economy: Male (36.4%) vs. Female (27.2%)
- Healthcare: Male (13.1%) vs. Female (22.7%)
- Education: Male (6.4%) vs. Female (4.7%)
- Environment: Male (4.5%) vs. Female (2.1%)
- Economy: Male (2.5%) vs. Female (1.8%)
- Education: Male (1.8%) vs. Female (1.1%)
- Environment: Male (1.0%) vs. Female (1.0%)

Translation of Trust
Identity

How individuals identify is also very important. Kosovars have long put their ethnic identity at the fore-front for this has been the line along which Kosovo Albanians were threatened, and it was precisely ethnic patriotism that mobilised resistance.

Identity is fluid and should be followed. Populistic politicians will use any potential for nationalistic discourse, while pragmatic politicians will carefully follow a window of opportunity to capture the attention of citizens with a vision for development. Over three quarters of respondents identified themselves as Albanian as their primary identity, and nearly
half of them as Kosovar as secondary identity. Around a third chose to identify themselves as Muslim as their second identity.

The brief discussion of several demographic features above paves the way to examine questions related to representation, participation, association, electoral process, electoral system, voting behaviour as well as leadership expectations, following in the remainder of the paper.
I. Representation

Representation is measured through a number of questions, and we have chosen a range that measures the degree that the Parliament mirrors our society, and an assessment of the range of memberships that individuals ascribe to.

**Does the Parliament Mirror Our Society?**

People’s affection for the parliament and how it mirrors our society is a key indicator of the evolution of our democracy. It is problematic than that around 41% feel that the Parliament does not mirror our society (with 27% feeling very strong about it). The share of Kosovars who feel that the Parliament does not represent us is significantly higher than those who believe the opposite.

![Bar chart showing the perception of the Parliament mirroring society](image)

Women are less critical than men as a lower proportion of them disagree that the Parliament mirrors the society. The generational divide with regard to the perception about the parliament reveals a high level of alienation of the young. This suggests a serious rate of disenfranchisement of youth...
and massive accumulated anger among those less able to benefit from spoils.

A similar trend holds for levels of education. Better educated citizens (more than 40% of respondents with secondary education) view the Parliament as less reflective of the society.

A cross-tabulation by party affiliation discovers that opposition fans disagree most that the Parliament reflects the society. Those who do not vote harbour even higher suspicion than the most antagonistic opposition. A similar situation is with undecided voters and with respondents who answered “refused” or “don’t know”.

Those who expressed the highest rate of mistrust towards results, also express highest misgiving about the votes’ influence on decision-making. Voters who saw the electoral process as unfair also believe that the Parliament is not representative of society. Respondents who see the Parliament as representative tend to change their vote at a lesser rate than those who see the opposite.
Cross-tabulating by income reveals a trend which is interesting but not surprising. The super-rich Kosovars are the least critical of the Parliament, consistent with a recent study that we conducted illustrating that a rich political class is emerging. It is also commonplace even in well-established democracies that the wealthy have it comfortable regardless of the party in power. This debate has not been part of Kosovo’s debate and a social strata that is well connected to politics has materialised. In this regard, the less critical attitude of the better-off is an additional proof of the clientelistic nature of governance.

Unlike the wealthy who command significant funding to influence policy, ordinary citizens have the numbers. The degree to which they associate with other like-minded citizens and how they organise jointly to push for particular policy is a major test of governance. The number of clubs respondents join to defend their interest is a key indicator of the trust they place in collective action.

**Membership Affiliation**

Membership in various organizations and advocacy through them is a key indicator whether the right of association is effectively exercised in practice. We primarily assessed one’s
membership in political parties, their closeness to them, and memberships in other non-party groups. The graph below depicts the decrease in membership in various types of membership organisation over time.

**Dwindling Association**

Party membership tops all other types of membership, followed by membership in labour unions, religious groups, civil society, while other types of memberships are negligible.

The major observation is that membership has dwindled over time. Except membership in religious groups, all other types of membership have decreased. Less educated respondents has seen a sharp increase in affiliation to religious groups. This is very worrisome for it is association that enables the plurality of opinion that democracy relies upon. Let us examine some of the reasons behind this fall
and how this impacts the future of democracy.

**Women Lag Behind in Association**

In our context it appears that membership primarily depends on gender. Men are more likely to be members of almost any type of membership groups, except charity organisations. To discern the reasons behind, it is necessary to further cross-tabulate results by a number of suspecting possible causes.

**Fall in Union Membership**
Although low even by capitalistic standards, labour union membership has fallen further steadily, and this is especially true for Kosovars with little education. There are two important lessons to draw from the graph above. Firstly, labour union membership is falling throughout the whole range of educational attainment, but it is not falling uniformly. Better educated workforce has seen a gradual decline in labour union membership, while less educated ones have seen a sharp drop (e.g. from 10% to virtually 0% for persons without formal education), which also reflects the inexistence of manufacturing.

It is interesting to note that education has high explanatory power not only for unions but for all types of membership. Party membership has overall declined among most groups, but compared over time, it has increased for respondents with higher education.

Membership in other groups is also an exclusive feature of better educated Kosovars. NGO membership is virtually an exclusive feature of Kosovars who have at least enrolled at
university, but it has fallen significantly for this group too.

**Political Parties**

The main difference in party membership is residence. Only one in 20 urban Kosovars is a member of a party, while rural Kosovars are 3-4 times more likely to be party members. The low standard of living and the lack of possibilities for the rural Kosovars may be the reason behind the higher interest in party membership – in the hope for better living conditions and as a pool to draw benefits and privileges from.

![Political Party Membership](image)

Except the overall residence breakdown, it is important to examine how closely respondents feel to politics and in what demographic traits does this depend on. Cross-tabulating by age reveals something to be expected, the young and the elderly are less attached to political parties, while the middle-aged are closer. The graph below illustrates a gender
difference whereby men feel much closer to politics than women.

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**Closeness to Political Parties (by gender)**

Closeness is naturally higher for members (88%) while lower for former members (65%) or for those who were never members (60%). There is a trend of the age of the party and the closeness that respondents felt to their party. Nearly two-thirds of the fans of well-established parties felt close to the party, while this rate dropped in 55-60% for the newer parties such as AKR and VV.

Voters who are close to a party also tend to believe that the power of the vote can influence decision-making. Close fans also tend to vote the same way for local and national elections if held on the same day. They also tend to be stable voters, whereby close to 70% of them have made up their mind which party to vote for well before the campaign starts, but it is surprising that a significant portion still decide on Election Day.

Rural areas exhibit not only higher membership in political parties but also in religious organisations and in youth associations, while city folks tend to be members in civil
society organisations.

**Closeness to the Party (by party)**

- **PDK**: Close 75%, Not close 18%
- **PD**: Close 73%, Not close 22%
- **LDK**: Close 73%, Not close 21%
- **AAK**: Close 79%, Not close 16%
- **VV**: Close 79%, Not close 18%
- **AKR**: Close 82%, Not close 14%
- **De/N Ref**: Close 48%, Not close 52%
- **De/N Ref**: Close 47%, Not close 53%
- **Would not vote**: Close 56%, Not close 44%
- **Refused**: Close 51%, Not close 49%
- **Don’t know**: Close 25%, Not close 75%
II. Participation

The degree that citizens take part in public affairs, impose their will on their representatives, and find ways to influence policy is the key difference from a procedural democracy. Voting is the main feature of participation, and we have inquired about people’s experience with voting.

Voter’s List

Not being included is a core indicator of exclusion of particular societal profiles. Respondents who believe they are not in the Voters’ List are at the very margins of the society and have virtually no chance to have their opinion heard in any shape or form.

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One in forty men are not in the voters list, while the rate of inclusion of women and youth is even lower. Better off Kosovars also report they are not in the voters list at a higher rate than the average. Party members are virtually always on the voter’s list, while around 5% of non-members are missing from the voters list. Those who tend to leave their decision whom to vote for on Election Day also tend to be missing from the VL more often than others.
The profiles which tend to be less included in the voters list also indicate there is a direct relationship between this inclusion and other types of public participation. Voters who said that their names could not be found on the VL, half voted conditionally (which means that their names were in the wrong polling station and were not absent altogether), while most gave up and in some cases, they voted with other peoples’ IDs.

**Turnout**

Of Kosovars who did not turn out to vote, it is important to discern the reasons behind such a choice. The largest category was youngsters who did not have the voting right because of their age (45%). In two previous studies (trends¹ and voter list audit²) we established that the reported turnout of 40-45% is not a proportion of residents but of erroneous voters’ lists. Around 70-80% of Kosovo’s real residents turn out to vote on average, as most non-voters are names of Kosovars who live in the diaspora, in Serbia or have since passed away.

The next largest category was those not interested in politics (15%), followed by those who did not vote because of personal reasons (10%). Better off Kosovars tend to turn out to vote in higher numbers than their poorer compatriots. Women cited personal other reasons more often while men claim they were not in Kosovo during this time or did not trust the regularity of the electoral process.

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Translation of Trust

Did Not Vote Because …
Influence

Another issue of high importance is the perception of one’s ability to have a say in matters that concern his/her surroundings. The young feel less influential at all levels, with only 1.8% perceiving that they have a say in matters that concern the country. They feel disempowered even with regard to matters that concern their family. Around 81-90% of respondents (depending on age groups) feel that they never have a say in matters that concern their municipality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>18-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>30-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60-69</th>
<th>&gt; 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>.7%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood/village</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>94.8%</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td>90.1%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another line of division is that of gender, whereby men clearly wield greater influence than women, especially in the age groups between 40 to 70. The elderly are generally more influential (with virtual monopoly in rural areas) and their
say holds more sway at all levels, from the family to the country.

Men wield greater influence in matters that concern the family, more than 60% of male respondents answered always compared with 45% of female respondents. As distance grows (from family to village, town, country), the influence decreases, in similar trend for both genders. Both genders feel that they have no say at all in matters that concern their country or municipality.

Education is another clear indicator of one’s influence, whereby those with higher education feel more empowered to influence decision-making at all levels. Every tenth well-educated respondent believes that s/he always has influence in the village/neighborhood, while two-thirds believe they sometimes have influence, and this drops significantly among the less educated.

The urban/rural distinction also yields interesting results. While urban residents perceive a higher influence in the family, their influence is lower in the neighborhood, municipality or nation compared to the townsfolk. Respondents who reported to live in smaller families reported a higher influence than those in larger families.
It is not surprising that respondents who are members in a party feel more influential at all levels, from the family to issues of national importance. Former members follow while the least empowered feel those who have never been members of any party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Less than primary education</th>
<th>Primary education</th>
<th>Less than secondary education</th>
<th>Secondary education</th>
<th>Less than university</th>
<th>Undergraduate degree</th>
<th>Postgraduate degree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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</table>

**Neighborhood/village**

| Always | 4.9%                          | 8.5%             | 7.6%                          | 8.8%                | 11.0%               | 12.7%               | 16.8%               | 9.9%  |
| Sometimes | 47.6%                        | 39.2%            | 32.8%                         | 37.9%               | 43.4%               | 43.3%               | 42.4%               | 89.0% |
| Never  | 43.5%                        | 54.9%            | 55.6%                         | 53.0%               | 39.1%               | 41.7%               | 42.4%               | 44.2% |

| Don't know | 8.7%                        | 1.2%             | 3.0%                          | 1.5%                | 4.7%                | 3.9%                | 2.5%                | 2.7%  |

**Municipality**

| Always | 2.7%                          | 1.1%             | 1.6%                          | 3.4%                | 2.6%                | 1.7%                |                     |       |
| Sometimes | 6.3%                        | 6.2%             | 10.7%                         | 7.6%                | 10.6%               | 16.5%               | 12.7%               | 36.8% |
| Never  | 78.2%                        | 92.6%            | 83.6%                         | 89.4%               | 88.1%               | 78.0%               | 82.2%               | 86.7% |

| Don't know | 10.0%                       | 7.2%             | 5.5%                          | 3.0%                | 2.0%                | 3.9%                | 1.1%                | 2.1%  |

**Country**

| Always | 1.2%                          | 1.1%             | 8%                            | 0%                  | 0%                  | 7%                  |                     |       |
| Sometimes | 3.4%                        | 2.7%             | 1.5%                          | 3.3%                | 3.1%                | 5.1%                | 16.7%               | 36.5% |
| Never  | 92.6%                        | 93.9%            | 92.0%                         | 96.5%               | 93.1%               | 93.8%               | 91.5%               | 77.8% |

| Don't know | 17.4%                       | 3.7%             | 4.0%                          | 3.0%                | 2.6%                | 8.6%                | 2.5%                | 6.6%  |

It is striking is that those who changed the party between 2007 and 2010 had the highest level of confidence and influence. The column with the voters who changed their vote (No), is higher than for those who voted the same (Yes). This is an indication that the change of the party is done by the more courageous who feel empowered upon the switch of loyalty.
Proportion of respondents who declare that they always have a say in matters that concern their...
(by frequency of religious practice)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Infrequently</th>
<th>Never</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… family</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… neighborhood/village</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… municipality</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… country</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
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</table>

Pious Kosovars also perceive that they have a strong say over matters in the family and higher up. Only 50% of secular respondents believe they have a say over matters concerning their family, compared to over 60% of those who frequently attend religious services.

**Contact with Representatives**

One’s ability to meet with political representatives is another important indicator of empowerment and accountability. A breakdown of results by education indicates that individuals with superior education are by far better placed to have contact with elected officials.

A similar trend applies throughout the levels of governance, but is especially sharp with regard to representation at the national level. It is conspicuous that individuals with a graduate degree are more likely to meet a Member of Parliament than a municipal councilor or mayor. While municipal officials are closer in proximity and are greater in number, it is possible that many respondents may not be aware of the councilors. Less educated voters are equally likely to have had an encounter with public utility companies (probably pay their bills), but have fewer chances to personally converse with elected officials.

Women are less likely to meet up an elected official than men. This may partly be explained by the fact that most elected officials are male (two-thirds). Except contacts with

30
the mayor, women have less chances even than the 30% quota beckons they should (which would assume that the rate of women should stand at around 50% of that of men).

---

**Share of respondents who had contacts with ...**

---

**Had contacts in the last twelve months**

It is interesting that urban residents are no more likely to meet politicians. Urban residents live in larger...
municipalities so it is natural that mayors and municipal councilors of large towns can devote less attention to their citizens (as the magnitude of representation means there are more voters per one councilor – around 2,600 voters per councilor in towns compared to around 1,200 in smaller municipalities). It is incredible that residents of the capital are no more likely to have a contact with MPs (and are less likely to have met the mayor personally), despite the geographic proximity to both.

Having a large family seems to be an advantage. The survey indicates that large families report to have met a councilor or mayor at a higher rate than small ones (11% compared to 6.7%). The explanation may be that in more communal parts of our society, either the large family serves as a magnet for politicians, or whomever may have met a politician counts for the whole family.

### Likelihood to have met an PM in the past 12 months (by party affiliation)

A cross-tabulation of ‘contacts’ by party lineage also divulges an interesting trend. Vetëvendosje fans are most likely to have met a Member of Parliament in the past year.
Considering that the young and urban voters (typical VV voters) are no more likely to have met mayors, and considering that Vetëvendosje is not among the main parties, it can only mean that its few MPs are far more active with their voters than those of other parties.

As with other indicators, religious observance is positively correlated with the likelihood to meet elected officials at all levels more frequently (by at least 20%).

Those who have had contacts with elected officials also believe that their vote makes a difference. Obviously, outreach by elected officials boosts the vote of the party and the turnout of their disciples. Those who met with elected officials were more likely to have voted the same way in 2010 as in 2007. In reverse, those who got less personal attention tended to switch party loyalty more often.

Contacts seem to be primarily party-related. A party member is almost ten times more likely to have met an MP than someone who has never been a member (21% vs 3%), a municipal councilor (33% vs. 5%), or mayor (29% vs 6%). This indicates that elected officials primarily meet with
party fans and rarely venture to independent voters.

Benefits of outreach seem to go primarily to the specific candidates and less to the party. Those who had contacts with elected officials appreciate the candidates more than the party (at a higher rate than other groups).
III. Trust in Elections

Except the general participation and representation, it is important that voters exhibit trust in the very institution of elections, in the importance that the vote is important, that they trust results, that they believe the voting was fair, and to what degree they observed violations.

Importance of Voting

One’s belief that the vote is important is essential indicator of the health of democracy in any given society. Inhabitants of rural Kosovo place higher premium on voting than urban inhabitants do (the citizens of Prishtina being the most distrustful).

There is a mild trend along education, whereby educated individuals have less trust in the power of the vote. Considering that educated individuals believe they have influence, this finding clearly indicates strong suspicion on the conduct of elections.

Educational Enhanced Trust on the Voting

There is a small difference between the two genders when it comes to the importance they attach to the vote. Men are much more suspicious and believe that their vote has
limited power, while women tend to trust the vote more (by 3%) but also to respond with ‘don’t know’ (by 5%).

Inhabitants of rural areas and villages trust the power of the vote more than the urban folk. Nearly 70% of rural inhabitants believe that the vote influences policy-making, compared to 60% of respondents in Prishtina and 65% in other towns.

Cross-tabulating results by political parties also yield thought-provoking results. Although Vetëvendosje fans see more fraud, they see the vote as very important at the same time. A major proportion of LDK fans seem to have resigned to this fact and see the vote as powerless.
**Fairness of Conduct**

Ascribing importance to elections is affected by the belief that the electoral conduct was fair. When asked whether the last elections were conducted fairly or unfairly, over 44% of the respondents answered unfairly.

**Last elections were conducted**

![Bar chart showing the perception of fairness in the last elections.](chart)

**Election results reflected the vote fairly**

![Bar chart showing the agreement with election results reflecting the vote fairly.](chart)
Most Kosovars are clearly disappointed with the way the voting process has gone. Women trend to trust more the fairness of elections (30% compared to 22% for men), but it must be noted that turnout of women in elections is about a third lower than that of men. Young Kosovars are more critical than the elderly.

Educated voters tend to be more critical towards the electoral conduct than less educated ones. The only category that see electoral conduct as fair were those without formal education. In all other categories, the proportion of those who thought that the process was unfair was double, with a gradually worsening trend that follows the years of educational attainment.

It is understandable that voters who trust the process tend to favour the parties, and those who harbour less trust, plump for the candidate (although the causality probably works both ways) (presented in the previous graph using indexed responses). A similar cross-tabulation also concludes that those who saw the process as unfair tended to vote differently between 2007 and 2010 (graph below).
There is a mixture of perceptions across the party spectrum. Most of the respondents who voted for Vetëvendosje or LDK think elections were conducted unfairly or somewhat unfairly. PDK voters in the other hand think that elections were conducted fairly or somewhat fairly and a very small number answered with unfairly.

**Trust in Results**

A key part of the electoral process is counting and this has been disputed in the past electoral cycles. It is disheartening that more Kosovars believe that results do not fairly reflect the way people voted. Almost a third of Kosovars fully disagree while only 12% fully agree.

The main trend appears when cross-tabulating by party membership, whereby fans of the main party tend to trust results more than others. PDK fans largely believe that results reflected the way people voted while most Vetëvendosje fans largely disagree. Fans of LDK, AAK and AKR tend to respond less radically. This question does not measure the accuracy of the results, but only a vague belief in the integrity of the vote and of the counting process.
The mistrust towards election results comes primarily from Prishtina, whose residents are the most suspicious of results, while rural voters are less critical. Respondents in rural areas trust that results reflect their vote.

Those who changed their voting choice from 2007 to 2010 were of the opinion that election results do not reflect voting intention. This indicates that fraud drives voters either to switch party loyalty or to withhold from voting altogether (see graph below).
**Belief in Results Influences Voting Choice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref/DK</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same as in 2007</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed choice</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not vote</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Violations**

The incidents that voters observed violations is another useful indicator of the electoral process. Respondents were asked if they observed pressure on voters, vote-buying, multiple voting or family voting. They were also asked how did they obtain such information, if they heard about any of these incidents in the news, were told by a friend or relative, or saw it themselves or happened to them.
Slightly less than half of the respondents answered that they did not see or hear about any of the violations numbered above, the other half stated that they either heard it in media or from others, and a small number around 5% answered that they saw it or happened to them.

The middle and the last category are the most problematic. The third one especially is the category of persons who had personal experience with fraud. In an earlier roundtable where we presented this data, several discussants thought that the rate of 4-5% was lower than they expected. But framing the percentage to present it to say that every 20th voter experienced some fraud personally, the problem suddenly seems far more serious. If each fraudulent incident involved a single vote, than around 5% (equivalent to five MPs) have been rigged. But most violations involve numerous votes, so the rate of vote-theft is probably much higher.

How voters spot violations and how they form an opinion clearly is affected by gender, level of education and other demographic factors. Those who have witnessed violations of various kind have changed party loyalty at a higher rate (by a rate of around 10% higher than others).
Age has a major explanatory power for elderly Kosovars have a higher level of tolerance for some widespread problems that many seem to accept as normal. Older respondents largely report not to have seen family voting, while the young do the opposite. This dichotomy is probably not a function of observation, but of the fact that the young are more aware that family voting constitutes a violation, unlike their grandparents.

Younger Kosovars have noticed more pressure on voters than elderly ones. Around 7% of Kosovars between 18-39 have personally witnessed violations, compared to just over 2% for elderly respondents.

The same trend observed with age groups can be observed when cross-tabulating by education whereby well-educated ones spot family voting more often than less educated ones. If the proliferation of higher education institutions does not give an edge to Kosova in science, at least it may make for a more dynamic political scene.

Party members see violations better because they are more interested to observe and denounce the vote-buying,
pressure and other forms of violations if they suspect unfair practice. Random voters and party members mostly hear about the multiple violations from media and others, though are inclined than women to see and hear about irregularities themselves.
IV. The Electoral System and Voting Behaviour

The question palette that assessed the system and voting behaviour generally focused on finding out if respondents (a) favour party or individual candidates (and by corollary if they prefer open or closed lists), (b) voted the same in 2010 as they did in 2007, (c) voted the same in the local elections of 2009 as they did in the national elections in 2010, (d) when did voters decide whom to vote for (before or during the campaign), (e) how do they decide about candidates, and (f) at what time of the day did they vote.

The Party or Individual Candidates?

The majority of respondents preferred open lists, 60%, against 33% who favoured closed lists. This indicates a preference for individual choice, but also mistrust on the party leadership.

![Open or Closed Lists](image)

Asked in a different way about the same quandary, respondents also declared that individuals are more important than the party. This indicates that the party scene has not consolidated and that Kosovars prefer that it does not consolidate as it is.

It is important to cross-tabulate this preference by various demographic features. Women prefer open lists to closed lists, but the
difference is not as high as among men. Women support closed lists at the rate of 35%, compared to 31% for men. They also tend to answer with ‘don’t know’ at a higher rate than men (11% compared to 6%).

Support for open lists goes up with age, with the elderly being more supportive of it (with the exception of the age group above 70). Education is also a strong indicator, whereas support for open lists sharply increases with education.

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**Open or Closed Lists? (by education)**

![Chart showing support for open or closed lists by education level.](image)

Religious and non-religious Kosovars favour open lists, although less religious ones are more fervent about them. Income also determines support for open lists, as getter paid Kosovars support open lists by 8 to 1, while poorer Kosovars barely do so.

It seems that personal allegiances have started to change the dynamics within political parties. Kosovars who are members in political parties support open lists, while former members favour closed lists. The biggest share of Kosovars belong in the category ‘never been a member’ and they mostly favour open lists.
The question if respondents favour the party or the candidate have elicited very similar answers but less sharp than when asked about open and closed lists. While this measures more or less the same issue, this indicates that the public is acutely aware and has strong opinion about the open/closed list debate. Open lists have recently come under attack for they were often blamed by critics that they enabled fraud. D4D’s position is that it is the preferential vote that enabled fraud. Open lists are not to blame, but should be enhanced with other features. We are satisfied that the wide public also believes that open lists should stay.
Respondents who feel close to a party favour the party while Kosovars who are loosely associated with parties tend to be attracted by the appeal of candidates.

**Voting Choice**

In 2010, the better off voted primarily for PDK, LDK and VV. AAK drew its voters more from the middle-income group, while AKR received most of its support from the poor. Interestingly, when asked how would they vote if elections were held the next Sunday, the income trend no longer holds. There is no distinct party that is expected to fare better among poor or of the rich.

The graph in the next page shows responses when asked how would they vote if elections were held next Sunday.

Breaking down voting intentions by various demographic profiles reveals some stunning trends. For example, all the traditional parties are comparatively stronger among the less educated, but have lost ground to Vetëvendosje among the better educated.
Perception of Representation and Participation

Voting Intention (by gender)
Voting intentions are closely linked with age groups as well (see graph below).

Piousness also divulges interesting results. Except the KKR coalition which clearly has a disproportionate share of pious voters, LDK has a high share of elderly who practice religion more than others. AAK clearly has higher support among secular Kosovar.
Perception of Representation and Participation

Party Choice 2010 (by piousness)
**Party Choice**

The party scene in Kosovo has often been termed static. There is a wide belief that new parties are put off by what they view as a scene that does not change over time. But the survey proves the opposite.

A fifth of respondents reported to have changed their party choice from 2007 to 2010. Only half voted the same which describe a far less stable party scene than is traditionally believed.

Educated voters tended to change their vote more often than others, as did voters who come from smaller families. A quarter of voters who live in small families (1-3 members) voted differently, compared to 16% of those in families of four or more members. Kosovars who do believe that voting is an important tool to influence policy tend to stick to the same party, while those who believe otherwise tend to withdraw and not vote.

Cross-tabulating this question with perception of fairness shows that Kosovars dislike rigged elections. Those who believed that results of the last elections were fair continued to vote the same way (or those who voted the same way did not mind the lack of fairness). Those who changed their parties tended to see and mind lack of fairness. This indicates that electoral fraud clearly has an impact on the voting choice and it would benefit the main parties to reduce fraud (see graph below and the previous section).
It is logical that party members do not switch loyalty often, for 70% stuck to the same choice between 2007-2010 (which is lower than we expected considering this is the fan base). Non-members tend to change the parties more often, as fewer than half voted the same way between.

It is important to examine what qualities voters seek and what do they see in the current parties. The survey also asked about party qualities and what are the reasons that voters choose a particular party, because of its leader, team quality, they know somebody in the party, or others (see graph in the next page). PDK and LDK draw disproportionately more voters because of connections which indicates that they have the widest patronage network. LDK mobilises a quarter of its voters who vote because of the leader, while 30% pick it for its engagement in the Kosovo interest, followed by 16% who follow the program quality.
### Party Qualities

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<tbody>
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<td>For the leader</td>
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<td>AAK</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>VV</td>
<td>AAK</td>
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<td>For the team quality</td>
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<td>For the programme quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Because I am member of that party</td>
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<tr>
<td>The party has the best candidates in the list</td>
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<tr>
<td>I know somebody in that party</td>
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<tr>
<td>I have a family member in that party</td>
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<td>The party in the regional interest</td>
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</table>
AAK draws voters through its leader, because they are members or because they know someone there. The Kosovo interest is a reason why a third of VV fans pick this movement, followed by 25% for the program quality and 17% for the leader.

It is interesting to observe that the rate of responses with refused or don’t know is highest when asked about the program quality or having best candidates in the list. Only 5-6.5% of respondents cite the team quality as a reason to vote for the party of their choice, but this rate increases for better-off (nearly a fifth). Around 4% pick their party either because they know somebody or have family members in that party. Party members more often cite the leader of the party as a reason to vote, while former members or non-member fans cite other reasons to vote for a party. The cross-tabulation above presents the share of qualities that voters saw in each party (as percentage of their share).

The graph below describes second choices, asked whom would respondents vote if their party of choice was not running. The second choice is important to assess: (a) which party is most likely to capitalise from anger towards the governing parties, and (b) mayoral candidates of which parties are likely to receive the support of others in the run-off.

AAK is the main second choice for most Kosovars, if their party was not running or if its candidate lost in the first round, and this holds especially true for age groups until 50. Although the second-largest party, LDK is seen as a safe choice for Kosovars of all ages but is not the primary party to attract the angry vote against the government. Vetëvendosje and AKR fair stronger among younger age groups (under 30) where they enjoy the trust of around 8% compared to other age groups with an average of 3.5-4%.
Translation of Trust

Second choice if your party was not running? (by party affiliation)
The survey also asked if voters voted the same in the local and the national elections, the party cross-tabulation of which is visualised below. The reason why AAK has a less disciplined voter base from local to national is that it reaches the run-off in fewer municipalities than the two main parties hence, where it is a third of fourth party, it attracts fewer votes for the mayoral than for other types of elections.

### Voted the same in National & Local Elections (by voting intentions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Yes 95%</th>
<th>No 4%</th>
<th>No, 3%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAK</td>
<td></td>
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**Campaign Effect**

This section continues the discussion to what degrees voters change their party choice. Unlike the previous section, this part also tries to answer when does the vote change occur.

The decision whom to vote is made by voters more than one month in advance (58.8%), then (14.8%) in the last month (14.8%). This leaves over 40% to decide in a single month when all parties are supposedly treated equally.

Women tend to be more influenced by the campaign. A higher proportion among women decides during the
campaign month, 5 days before and on Election Day. Well educated are less influenced by the campaign. Only 8% of respondents with college degree or more decide on Election Day, compared to around 18% for respondents with less then primary education.

Kosovars who changed their voting choice between 2007 and 2010, made their mind at different times. About a quarter decided well before the campaign, a quarter during the campaign, about almost a third in the days before and on Election Day.
When do voters decide whom to vote for? (by party affiliation)
Cross-tabulating by party yields remarkable results. Many AAK voters decide to vote for them on Election Day, consistent with their choice as a second safe bet, but also points to the unstable electoral base, likely to dissipate given mistakes. As a new party, AKR’s voters are also not “married” to the party. As most of their voters decide to vote for them during the campaign, their voter base is fleeting and unstable. As a proportion of its own voter base, most Vetëvendosje voters have made their mind well ahead of the campaign.

LDK also a stable voter base, but its share of firm voters is thinner than that of VV. PDK has best campaigns for its main voting body seem to decide during this period, although it has a large stable base (larger than others in number, but not as a proportion of its size).

Voters decide whom to vote for ... (by income in Euro)

Voters who cite team and program quality tend to decide well in advance about the party to vote for, while a larger chunk of those who plump for leaders tend to postpone their final decision until the campaign or the very Election Day.
Around 8% see the candidate list as the most important criteria and most of them decide during the campaign and in the closing days before Election Day.

Looking at the data by income also shows a mild but unmistakable trend whereby the poor and the rich tend to be firm voters, whereas it is the working class that is still shopping around for a patron.

**Choice of Candidate and Time of Vote**

How voters decide to mark the names of individual candidates (given 5 choices for the National Assembly) is also important for this ultimately decides about the composition of our highest legislative body. Nearly a quarter reported to have chosen the first five names very fast, which defeats the purpose of the open list, as does another chunk of 12% who vote as suggested by the leader. The real value of the open lists remains to be determined by voters who pick candidates who are professionally proven (36%), or from the same town (11%), or whom they know personally (7%), etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection of Candidates</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very fast I chose the 5 first names</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates from your own city</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates of your age or gender</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates that I know personally</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates close to the leader or suggested by the party</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates professionally proven</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates proven during the war</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Refuses/Don’t Know</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At what time of day do voters actually go to the polls seems trivial but is important. There is a trend for several sets of elections in Kosovo whereby after 5 pm, there is a suspiciously high turnout. Asking voters when they voted
can point to a potential mismatch between turnout as observed on Election Day (reported in our publication about the Ferizaj and Kaçanik by-elections) and the answers of respondents in the survey. Observers report turnout also of fraudulent voters who may vote on behalf of others or multiple times, which the survey does not show. If the difference is large enough and is statistically relevant, than such fraud can be proven that exists and is massive.

It is also interesting to observe the gender trends as per the time of day they go to the polls. Women vote in fewer numbers especially between 1-3 pm, and in higher numbers between 9-11 am and 3-5 pm. An age breakdown indicates that the elderly vote mainly in the morning. There are also some mild trends across the parties. LDK voters tend to vote in greater numbers in the morning, while Vetëvendosje in late hours.

V. Leadership Expectations

An important part of the democratic exercise are the reasons why individuals vote for certain leaders and not for others. It is essential to assess what qualities voters seek among leaders, for ultimately this dictates the kind of governance we obtain in return.

Generally What Leaders Kosovars Want?

Virtually all Kosovars thought that the most important attributes they seek among leaders are education, followed by knowledge, not being corrupt, moral, courageous, hard-working and being visionary (see graph in the next page). Having participated in the war is no longer important, which shows increasing maturity of pragmatic politics among the voters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party fans who see it as very important for a leader to be knowledgeable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDK 99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To distinguish preferences and values by party lineage, we cross-tabulated results by party affiliation. Most values are shared across parties, but some less so. For example, virtually all LDK fans value knowledge as necessary among leaders, while this is less esteemed among AAK voters.
Most important values for a leader

- Education: 99.6
- Knowledgeable: 99.5
- Not corrupt: 98.3
- High integrity: 97.8
- Courage: 97.7
- High education: 97.3
- Hardworking: 95.6
- Being a visionary: 93.5
- Dedicated to higher causes: 89.7
- Being rich: 56.7
- Having participated in the war: 53.3
- Having good looks: 48.8
- Gender: 48.1
- 31.6
There are a few gender differences about the traits, most notably, women did not share the opinion that being a visionary or being dedicated to higher causes were very important. There is also a party trend whereby Vetëvendosje fans value vision more so than others.

**Party fans who see it as very important for a leader to be a visionary**

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**What do Kosovars Think of Current Leaders?**

While the previous question asked hypothetical values, another question asked what traits do they value in the current leadership. We assessed overall popularity as well as what specifically voters see in particular leaders.

The current Prime Minister, Hashim Thaçi stands out for two qualities, being a strong leader and instilling hope. The President of the second-largest party and Mayor of Prishtina stands out as knowledgeable and honest. Haradinaj is seen as strong but also as someone who brings change. Kurti scores equally high on most qualities, except as a strong leader. Pacolli ranks high on being caring to people. We also assessed the image of other figures, whereby Surroi was associated exclusively with being knowledgeable while Jakup Krasniqi as sincere.
Translation of Trust

Traits of current leaders
The same two leaders who give most hope, are the very same ones that instill most fear among people (17% respond to fear Thaçi and 10% fear Kurti). Almost a quarter of respondents reply that no leader gives them hope. When asked who will bring change, Haradinaj joins Thaçi and Kurti. Over a third of respondents replied that no leader cares about people.

There are also trends across gender. With regard to 'being a strong leader”, women tend to appreciate Hashim Thaçi more than men, while less so with regard to Ramush Haradinaj or Jakup Krasniqi. Men see Surroi, Kurti and Mustafa as most knowledgeable, but women see Thaçi topping this list.

The most visible factor that differentiates loyalty across party fans seems to be age (see graph in the previous page). If ‘others’ or ‘none’ were real leader names, they would have been the most popular.

Kurti enjoys the highest rate of popularity among the youngest voters (18-29) and hardly competes among other age groups. The next age group, 30-39, prefer Thaçi, Mustafa and Jahjaga. The age group most dissatisfied with all leaders are those between 40-49. Among the few which indicated leader favourites, Thaçi and Mustafa score highest. The most elderly (>69) clearly favour Isa Mustafa, although most elderly (> 50) also favour Haradinaj.

Except the popularity and traits, we also assessed the level of discipline among fans and the level of outreach among the general population. The graph in the next page looks at leader popularity among their own voters as well as among fans of other parties.
Leaders' support among age groups
Except assessing their popularity among their own fans, it is important to gauge the popularity of the leaders among the general population. One indicator we assessed was the rate of like and dislike by other party fans (see graph in the next page).

Kurti enjoys the highest popularity among Vetëvendosje voters, while Mustafa mobilises his party fans least, but enjoys substantial support from AKR fans. A significant chunk of LDK voters favour no leaders, a proportion exceeded only by PDK fans. Pacolli enjoys solid support among his party, but fares worst of all leaders in outreach to other party supporters.

The graph in next page omits LDD which we present separately below. It is important to present a graph of LDD voters (as few as they are) as this party melts away. While LDD has struck a coalition with AAK, most of its followers have the most favourable opinion about Mustafa, while Haradinaj is their third most favourable option (of this list). Apparently Daci’s academic part also lends some support to Surroi.

What do LDD voters think about other leaders?
Leaders support among own fans and among other parties

![Bar chart showing support percentages among different leaders and parties.](chart.png)
The most interesting may be to assess where the current President Jahjaga obtains her support, not that she ever stood the electoral test (see next page). She is seen as most favourable by AKR (and PD) and AAK fans, followed by LDK and PDK. She enjoyed the highest opposition by Vetëvendosje voters, and by those who state that they would not vote.
Jahjaga’s popularity (by party affiliation)
Conclusions

Kosovars are primarily concerned with economic development and increasingly seek pragmatic qualities among their leaders. The traits we ask from leaders are clearly evolving although they are the traits that will take Kosovo to the most exclusive club of democratic nations.

Parties are yet in their infancy to identify voter groups that best match what they stand for. We believe that the next 4-5 years will be decisive in how the parties position and what voters they seek to fish in their net. Candidates will increasingly speak about concerns and interests of well-defined groups and will carve out a voter base that is less geographic.

We hope that parties will take note of some of the conclusions and realize that if they meet independent voters more, they will be able to gather more votes in their midst. Municipal councilors may start to take a more long-term view, and we hope that all elected officials will be motivated by more than a salary for four years.

As education picks up, rural voters may become more distrustful and may ask more from their leaders, and may switch their vote as often as the urban folks to. Most Kosovars are clearly disappointed with the way the voting process has gone, and we may expect that ordinary people will report violations more often, which may reduce the need for massive observation that we have come to rely upon.

Leaders will be more assessed about their performance as politics becomes less personal and radioactive. The greatest space for new voters remains among women who vote less and whose interests are not looked after by any of the groups. The party that mobilises women may call itself the winner on November 4th.
List of Publications

Elections:

Ethnic Relations:

Public Interest:
#2: Gashi, Drilon and Shoghi Emerson. May 2013. A Class of Its Own: Patronage and its impact on Social Mobility in Kosovo.
#3: Visar Sutaj and Leon Malazogu. January 2013. Let the Real Civil Society Please Stand Up! The Role of Membership Associations in Shaping Decision-Making to Serve the Public Interest.

**Memos:**


#2: D4D. December 2012. Reaction Memo Nr. 2. The two Germanies model

#3: D4D. July 2013. Reaction Memo Nr. 3. Set Criteria for New Municipalities

**Indicators:**


#2: D4D. State of the State: Performance Based Indicators.

**D4D in other publications:**

SüdostEuropa Mitteilungen. 05-06 2012.

Leon Malazogu and Florian Bieber.

The Future of Interaction between Belgrade and Prishtina.

Forum 2015. Series analysis “What Went Wrong”?

Series: Elections

1. Malazogu, Leon 2. Kllokoqi, Selatin

Democracy for Development (D4D) is a think-tank organization established in 2010 with the vision that democracy is a precondition for development. The founding members of D4D believe that democracy is both a means and ends for development and they have tasked themselves with a mission to research and reach out to a wider community of stakeholders to make this link apparent.

D4D’s mission is to influence the development of public policy to accelerate the socio-economic development of Kosovo, improve governance, and strengthen democratic culture in the country.

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