# Electoral System: 

districts open lists one-tick threshold

## Legal Basis

## Constitution of Kosovo

Article 66.5: Conditions, districts and election procedures are regulated by law.

## Law on General Elections

Article 10.1: Kosovo shall be considered a single, multi-member electoral district.

## Venice Commission - Code of Good Electoral Practices

- When designing the boundaries of electoral districts.... They should be don: in a neutral way, without damaging national minorities; - while taking into consideration of commission, the majority of the members should be independent
- It is suggested for the committee to include a geographer, sociologist, and a balanced representation of parties and if requested, the representatives of national minorities"


## Regional Practices

Regional Electoral Experiences

|  | Albania | B\&H | Croatia | Montenegro | Macedonia | Serbia |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Electoral System <br> (Majoritarian/Proportional) | Proportional, <br> closed lists | Proportional, <br> open lists | Proportional, <br> closed lists | Proportional, <br> closed lists | Proportional, <br> closed lists | Proportional, <br> closed lists |
| Number of Districts | 12 districts | BH-12 districts; <br> Rep. Srpska -6 distc | 10 districts | 1 election <br> district | 6districts | 1 election <br> district |
| Threshold | $3 \%$ for <br> political <br> parties | $3 \%$ for political <br> parties (SP), $5 \%$ <br> for coalitions(K) | $5 \%$ <br> threshold | No <br> threshold | $3 \%$ for <br> political <br> parties | $5 \%$ for political <br> parties <br> not for minorities |
| Representation of <br> minorities | NO | N/A | 8 reserved <br> seats | 5 reserved <br> seats | NO | Threshold does <br> not apply |
| Equal mandates | NO | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |

## Proposal - Reforma 2004

Two-tier: 90 seats from 7 electoral districts with open lists. 30 compensatory seats from closed party lists at the national level.

Ballot: One vote with the only possibility of voting for individual candidates. Since all the votes are counted first to determine the total number of votes for a party, and since 30 seats are left to the parties for nomination in discretion, it was justified that there is no need for a possibility to vote for the party because of the risk of manipulation.


## Guiding principles of the system

Allocation of seats and threshold to be applied at the national level and not at the district level;
2. Guarantee $30 \%$ gender quota;
3. Strict proportional system;
4. The ballot to be with names of candidates;
5. To keep the open lists system;

## Decision Tree



## First Decision

$\square$ One or more districts?

## Advantages of Geographical Representation

$\square$ Strengthen the link between the electorate and elected officials
$\square$ Voters may ask for more responsibility, are likely to elect members they know better
$\square$ Weaken the party hierarchy enabling the party to become more democratic
$\square$ Strengthen the citizen and not the party leader
$\square$ Favors MPs with direct local support and adds geographic diversity in the Parliament
$\square$ The impact of MPs increases in Parliament and within the Party because they MPs acquire specific obligation toward voters
$\square$ Individual candidates who cannot afford to stage a campaign throughout Kosovo are more equal to others within electoral districts
$\square$ Pushes Parties seek to disassociate from regional labels
$\square$ Reduces the power dominance of Prishtina

## Disadvantages of the Districts

$\square$ Districts may lead to less proportional election results (addressed in our model)
$\square$ May effect the representation of minorities and the smaller parties (addressed in our model)
$\square$ May require an additional step in the process of voters verification, proof of residence within state and within the specific district
$\square$ Districts produce fewer ideas and programs and more powerful people in region with formal and informal networks
$\square$ Some complication with the production and distribution of ballots
$\square$ Regional representation weakens national agendas and increases regional one
$\square$ Districts will make political and electoral competition more personal and less programmatic
$\square$ Weakens ideological agendas and these of specific interests
$\square$ More complicated procedures for voting abroad and to verify the eligibility of the candidates

## Second Decision

$\square$ Avoid a committee for delimitation, and search for an existing regional organization

## Existing Regional Organization

## PROs

$\square$ Avoid the creation of a committee that could prolong and politicize the process of districting.

## CONs

$\square$ Limits the options to 5, 6, 7, 37 districts and dependent on the level of acceptance by the political parties to 8 and 26 districts.

## Size of Districts

| 5 Districts | \# | 6 Districts | \# | 7 Districts | \# | 8 Districts | \# |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{CHil}+\mathrm{Fer}$ | 21 | Giil | 11 | Giil | 11 | Gil | 11 |
| Pz | 15 | Pz | 15 | Pz | 15 | Pz | 15 |
| $\mathrm{Pej}+\mathrm{Cja}$ | 25 | Pej $+\mathbf{G j a}$ | 25 | Pej | 13 | Pei | 13 |
| Mit | 14 | Mit | 14 | Mit | 14 | Mit | 14 |
| Prn | 25 | Prn | 25 | Prn | 25 | Prn (region) | 10 |
|  |  | Fer | 10 | Fer | 10 | Fer | 10 |
|  |  |  |  | Gja | 12 | Gja | 12 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Prn (municp.) | 15 |

## 26 Election Districts - DiA

## DiA

70 seats in 26 districts
\& 30 seats at national level

| -Prishtinë + Graçanicë | 8 | Malishevë | 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| -Prizren + Mamushë | 7 | Skenderaj | 2 |
| -Mitrovicë+Zubin Potok | 4 | Viti+KIllokot+Partesh | 2 |
| -Ferizaj | 4 | Kacanik+HaniElezit+Shtërpcë | 2 |
| -Pejë | 4 | Kamenicë + Novobërdë+Ranillug | 2 |
| GJakovë | 4 | Decan+Junik | 2 |
| -Gjilan | 4 | Leposavic + Zveçan | 2 |
| Podujevë | 3 | Istog | 2 |
| Vushtrri | 3 | Klinë | 1 |
| Suharekë | 2 | Fushë Kosovë | 1 |
| -Drenas | 2 | Dragash | 1 |
| -Lipjan | 2 | Shtime | 1 |
| -Rahovec | 2 | Obiliq | 1 |

## Evaluation of Differnet Options

|  | 1 DISTRICT | 5 DISTRICTS <br> District Courts | 6 DISTRICTS <br> MIA | 7 DISTRICTS <br> SOK and some ministries | 8 DISTRICTS <br> $7+$ PRN/2 | $\begin{gathered} \mathbf{2 6} \\ (\mathrm{DiA}) \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Technically easy/difficult process of dividing districts | Easy | Easy | Easy | Easy | Easy | Easy |
| Politically easy/difficult process of dividing districts | N/A | Could face resistance from Gjakova and Ferizaj | Could face resistance from Gjakova | Could face resistance from Malisheva | Complicated in Prishtina | Could require a commission |
| Need for a commission to divide districts | N/A | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Regional identification of MPs | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Domination of Prishtina | High | Medium | Medium | Medium | Very Low | Very Low |
| Level of Acceptance by minorities | 10 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 0 |
| Securing the meriotorious participation of women | 7 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 1 |
| Garantees the representation of every municipality | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Geographical representation | Low | 3/10 | 4/10 | 5/10 | 6/10 | 8/10 |
| Design of the ballot (with 70 seats through districts) | no names | With names A3 | With names A3 | With names A3 | With names A3 | With names A4-A3 |
| Stands of EWG | $\begin{aligned} & \text { VV, AAK, SLS } \\ & \text { KIPRED } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  | PDK ( 6 or more districts) | LDK <br> (more than 6 districts) |  | DiA |

## Third Decision: What model?

$\square$ Choose among the $5,6,7$, and 37
$\square$ If not politicized, consider 8 and 26

## Extreme effect of districts

| Party A | $51 \%$ | $51 \%$ | $51 \%$ | $51 \%$ | $51 \%$ | $51 \%$ | $51 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Party B | $49 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $49 \%$ | $49 \%$ |
|  | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ |
| Party A | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  |

$\square$ Imagine a place with 7 MPs; 1 MP from each district and only two parties in the race;
$\square$ We see an example of extreme majoritarian distortion;
$\square$ Even large districts have a bit of this effect, however small it may be.

## Calculating the size of the districts

$\square$ General Electorate: 1,632,276
$\square$ Divided by 70 seats
$\square$ Gives 23,318 voters per one representative
$\square$ Therefore the electorate would be divided into districts of 23,318
$\square$ Then calculation of the largest remainder
$\square$ Addition of the largest remainder gives the general total of the districts for the Assembly of Kosovo.

## Number of MPs per district?

|  | Municipalities |  |  |  |  |  | Region |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Prishtina | 161,236 | 21,313 | 16,825 | 28,105 | 75,636 | 50,374 | 46,657 | 400,146 |
| Prizren | 144,579 | 36,658 | 57,617 | 3,112 |  |  |  | 241,966 |
| Mitrovica | 86,834 | 16,730 | 49,320 | 63,300 | 7,563 | 8,475 |  | 232,222 |
| Peja | 93,721 | 37,244 | 40,778 | 38,705 |  |  |  | 210,448 |
| Gjilan | 87,387 | 35,381 | 7,936 | 42,882 | 4,929 | 3,694 | 2,785 | $\mathbf{1 8 4 , 9 9 4}$ |
| Ferizaj | 91,876 | 22,313 | 12,604 | 30,308 | 7,943 |  |  | 165,044 |
| Gjakova | 97,215 | 49,321 | 44,089 | 5,191 |  |  |  | 195,816 |
| TOTAL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $1,630,636$ |


|  | Region |  | full nr. | remaind. | total |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Prishtina | $\mathbf{4 0 0 , 1 4 6}$ | $24.5 \%$ | 24 | 1 | 25 |  |
| Prizren | 241,966 | $14.8 \%$ | 14 | 1 | 15 |  |
| Mitrovica | 232,222 | $14.2 \%$ | 14 |  | 14 |  |
| Peja | 210,448 | $12.9 \%$ | 12 |  | 1 | 13 |
| Gjilan | $\mathbf{1 8 4 , 9 9 4}$ | $11.3 \%$ | 11 |  | 11 |  |
| Ferizaj | 165,044 | $10.1 \%$ | 10 |  | 10 |  |
| Gjakova | $\mathbf{1 9 5 , 8 1 6}$ | $12.0 \%$ | 12 |  | 12 |  |
| TOTAL | $1,630,636$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 7}$ |  | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ |

## Number of MPs per district? Distribution of 70

|  |  | Weight of Districts |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 100 |  |  | 70 |  |  |  |  |
|  | Region |  | full nr. | remaind. | total |  | full nr . | remaind. | total |
| Prishtina | 400,146 | 24.5\% | 24 | 1 | 25 | 17.18\% | 17 |  | 17 |
| Prizren | 241,966 | 14.8\% | 14 | 1 | 15 | 10.39\% | 10 |  | 10 |
| Mitrovica | 232,222 | 14.2\% | 14 |  | 14 | 9.97\% | 9 | 1 | 10 |
| Peja | 210,448 | 12.9\% | 12 | 1 | 13 | 9.03\% | 9 |  | 9 |
| Gjilan | 184,994 | 11.3\% | 11 |  | 11 | 7.94\% | 7 | 1 | 8 |
| Ferizaj | 165,044 | 10.1\% | 10 |  | 10 | 7.09\% | 7 |  | 7 |
| Gjakova | 195,816 | 12.0\% | 12 |  | 12 | 8.41\% | 8 | 1 | 9 |
| TOTAL | 1,630,636 | 100\% | 97 | 3 | 100 | 70\% | 67 | 3 | 70 |

$\square$ A: Share of the electorate for each district (\%)
$\square$ B: Share of each district (full integer, without the remained)
$\square$ C: The largest remainder
$\square$ D: Number of seats of each district

## Mandates in one Districts

|  | Prishtina | Obiliq | Gracanica | F. Kosovë | Podujeva | Lipjan | Prishtina |  | 17/70 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Gllogovc | District |  |  |
| PDK | 13,231 | 2,186 | 89 | 2,484 | 8,604 | 10,692 | 22,133 | 59,419 | 30.0\% 5.11 | 5 |
| LDK | 31,096 | 2,997 | 149 | 4,512 | 17,185 | 7,920 | 642 | 64,501 | 32.6\% 5.55 | 6 |
| AAK | 4,565 | 562 | 13 | 520 | 1,691 | 919 | 278 | 8,548 | 4.3\% 0.73 | 1 |
| KKR | 11,526 | 667 | 77 | 934 | 1,696 | 1,533 | 429 | 16,862 | 8.5\% 1.45 | 1 |
| LDD | 1,787 | 140 | 69 | 244 | 221 | 492 | 17 | 2,970 | 1.5\% 0.26 |  |
| FER | 5,232 | 82 | 9 | 193 | 416 | 226 | 20 | 6,178 | 3.1\% 0.53 | 1 |
| VETVENDOSJE | 15,899 | 1,753 | 49 | 2,122 | 5,313 | 2,361 | 522 | 28,019 | 14.2\% 2.41 | 2 |
| SLS | 183 | 263 | 4,503 | 238 | 3 | 290 |  | 5,480 | 2.8\% 0.47 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 17 |

## $\square$ Example of Prishtina district using the 2010 figures

## Distortion from Districts

Seats won from 7 districts in a total of 100 seats

| W/O Threshold | Pr | Pz | Mi | Pe | Gji | Fe | Gja | Total from distrct. | Strict-NTW-PR | Effect of Districting |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PDK | 8 | 5 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 38 | 34 | 4 |
| LDK | 8 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 24 | 27 | -3 |
| AAK | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 12 | -1 |
| KKR | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 1 |
| LDD |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |
| FER | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |
| VETEVENDOSJE | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 14 | -3 |
| JSL |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |  | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| SLS | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  |  | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| VAKAT |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| KDTP |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 0 |
|  | 25 | 15 | 14 |  | 11 | 10 | 12 | 100 | 100 |  |

We lose the strict proportionality

## Why 70 in districts and 30 strict proportional?

$\square$ The distortion violates full proportionality hence we cannot recommend that all 100 representatives are allocated from the districts
$\square$ There is a need for flexibility to compensate for the proportional system and the gender quota
$\square$ Protect the PR system at the central level;
$\square$ Solution: 30 seats would be used to secure the gender quota.

## Seat Allocation Simulation

| Vendet e fituara nga 7 zona që bëjnë 70 ulëse |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | nga 100 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Pr | Pz | Mi | Pe | Gji | Fe | Gja | Total nga zonat |  | Total me PR në tërë vendin | Kompenz uese |
| PDK | 5 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 24 |  | 34 | 10 |
| LDK | 6 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 19 |  | 27 | 8 |
| AAK | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 10 |  | 12 | 2 |
| KKR | 1 |  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |  | 8 | 4 |
| LDD |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 |  |  | 0 |
| FER | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |  | -1 |
| VETEVENDOSJE | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 |  | 14 | 5 |
| SLS | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 2 | 1 |
| VAKAT |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 1 | 0 |
| KDTP |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 1 | 0 |
| JSL |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0 |  | 1 | 1 |
|  | 17 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 70 | 0 | 100 | 30 |

Remaining 30 would be used to secure the strict proportion al system and the gender quota

## Size of districts and the Design of the Ballot

If 70 distributed through districts - Ballot in A3
$\square$ Prishtina 17 seats - 19 names per party

Modeling with 7 dist.

|  | $\mathbf{7 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Prn | 17 | 25 |
| Pz | 10 | 15 |
| Mi | 10 | 14 |
| Pe | 9 | 13 |
| Gj | 8 | 11 |
| Fe | 7 | 10 |
| Gja | 9 | 12 |
|  | $\mathbf{7 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0}$ |

## Strict Proportional 70/30 system

E.g. If LDK would win 27 seats with $26 \%$ of the votes ( 1 extra seat from the distribution of the $4 \%$ won by LDD and FER who did not pass the threshold), 9 of its MPs would have to be from the less represented gender (women);
$\square$ If at the district level LDK would win 19 seats, 7 of them women;

- It would have to be compensated with 8 more mandates to ensure full proportionality ( $19+8=27$ ). To bring women's representation to nine, two of the 8 would need to be allocated to women (7+2 = 9).
$\square$ First we would pull up the 6 women with the most votes (of those not won by merit), no matter what district they are from, and then two men in the same way.


## Compensatory seats for women

|  | Strict PR | From Distrct. <br> $(70 \%)$ | Compensati <br> on |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | :--- |
| LDK | 27 | 19 | 8 |
| PDK | 34 | 24 | 10 |


| 30\% <br> women | Women by <br> Merit at Distct. |
| :--- | :--- |
| 9 | 7 |
| 11 | 2 |


| Gender qutoa by this system |  | Compensation for men | Compens ation |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | + | 6 | 8 |
| 9 | + | 1 | 10 |

## Minority Candidates run in all districts

$\square$ Minority communities are scattered around Kosovo;
$\square$ Political parties of minority communities, who have most of their votes concentrated in one district, are worried that they will lose the votes of their community on the other districts, however little that vote may be;

- Minorities Political Parties have proposed one-election zone.
$\square$ Same list of candidates of minority parties to appear on ballots of all the districts that the party chooses;
$\square$ Voters of minority communities of Gorazhdevc (Peja district) and Gracanica (Prishtina district) could vote for the same candidates;
$\square$ No separate ballot for the minority parties that would be the same in all districts since this would complicate the voting process.


## Reforma Forum: Threshold 3\%

## PROs

$\square$ Lower from 5\%, which is considered very high
$\square$ Secures a threshold that provides for a stable governing coalition;
$\square$ Enables entrance of new and serious alternatives to the AoK

## How?

$\square$ Does not apply to independent
candidates;
$\square$ For coalitions remains at $5 \%$;
$\square$ Does not apply to parties of minorities;
$\square$ Applied in the central level

## How the threshold works in districts?

| Modeling with 7 dist. |  |  | Natural Threshold |  | Natl Threshold |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 70 | 100 | 70 | 100 |  |
| Prn | 17 | 25 | 5.9 | 4.0 | 3\% |
| Pz | 10 | 15 | 10.0 | 6.7 | 3\% |
| Mi | 10 | 14 | 10.0 | 7.1 | 3\% |
| Pe | 9 | 13 | 11.1 | 7.7 | 3\% |
| Gj | 8 | 11 | 12.5 | 9.1 | 3\% |
| Fe | 7 | 10 | 14.3 | 10.0 | 3\% |
| Gja | 9 | 12 | 11.1 | 8.3 | 3\% |
|  | 70 | 100 | 10.7 | 7.6 |  |
|  |  |  | mesa |  |  |

For a party to enter the Assembly,
$\square$ it should either pass the $3 \%$ threshold at the central level (even if it doesn't get any mandate in any of the districts) or
$\square$ if it manages to get a seat in one of the districts but doesn't pass the 3\% nationally, it would keep that seat.

